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I. INTRODUCTION
People are more than their brains. Legal and social
traditions have long held people accountable for their behavior
under the presumption that most behavior is intentional and
the product of conscious decision-making.1 The elementary
premise that actions have legal and social consequences is
firmly embedded in the vernacular of most cultures.2 When
 2010 Steven K. Erickson.
* Steven K. Erickson is a visiting Associate Professor of Law, University of
Missouri School of Law. He is deeply indebted to the thoughtful comments
provided by Stephanos Bibas, Stephen Morse, Jon Klick, Amy Wax, Jeff
Rachlinski, David Skeel, Michael Perlin, Paul Litton and the participants of
the ad hoc faculty workshop series at the University of Pennsylvania Law
School. Bill Draper provided excellent research assistance.
1. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952) (“The
contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted with by
intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent
in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a
consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good
and evil.”); Roscoe Pound, Introduction to FRANCIS BOWES SAYRE, A
SELECTION OF CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW, at xxxvi-xxxvii (1927) (“Historically,
our substantive criminal law is based upon a theory of punishing the vicious
will. It postulates a free agent confronted with a choice between doing right
and doing wrong and choosing freely to do wrong.”).
2. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice:
Implications for Criminal Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 8–11
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someone breaches a legal or social code, the whole person is
considered responsible for her behavior and not some
constituent part of her entity that bears the punishment.
Unlike machines, people are measured in their totalitya bad
part does not render a person worthless.
Yet emerging conceptions of personhood generated by
cognitive neuroscience suggest something very different from
this entrenched view.3 Instead of people, cognitive neuroscience
posits brains as the exclusive agents of behavior and suggests
brains are incapable of blame because of their mechanical and
Minds
and
brains
are
held
determined
nature.4
synonymousthoughts, desires, and behaviors are regarded as
no more than the yield of fixed neuronal tissue.5 All mentation
is considered exclusively the product of brain structure and
function, which is accessible, measurable, and predictable using
an array of novel technologies understood by a select few. This
view has led to speculation that an inevitable and radical
overhaul of legal and social constructions of personal
responsibility is invariably at hand.6 Much of the recent legal

(2007); James Q. Wilson, The Moral Sense, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1, 1 (1993).
3. See Deborah W. Denno, Crime and Consciousness: Science and
Involuntary Acts, 87 MINN. L. REV. 269, 271–74 (2002); Joshua Greene &
Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything,
359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y B 1775, 1780–81 (2004); Maureen Sie &
Arno Wouters, The Real Challenge to Free Will and Responsibility, 12 TRENDS
COGNITIVE SCI. 3, 3 (2007) (“Recent developments in the behavioral-,
cognitive- and neurosciences indicate that, more often than not, we act in an
automatic and unaware fashion, making up reasons only as we go along.”).
4. For an overview of the arguments see Adina Roskies, Neuroscientific
Challenges to Free Will and Responsibility, 10 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 419
(2006); see also Jeffery M. Schwartz et al., Quantum Physics in Neuroscience
and Psychology: A Neurophsyical Model of Mind-Brain Interaction, 360 PHIL.
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y B 1309, 1313–15 (2005) (discussing ways classic
physics lends to understanding mental capacity: (1) as a casually impotent
sideshow of the brain or (2) as the very same thing as some pattern of the
brain’s various tiny parts).
5. As it was famously put “your joys and your sorrows, your memories
and your ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no
more than a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules.”
FRANCIS CRICK, THE ASTONISHING HYPOTHESIS: THE SCIENTIFIC SEARCH FOR
THE SOUL 3 (1994); see also MARVIN L. MINSKY, THE SOCIETY OF MIND 287
(1986) (“Minds are simply what brains do.”); Greene & Cohen, supra note 3, at
1779 (“It is not as if there is you, the composer, and then your brain, the
orchestra. You are your brain.”).
6. See DERK PEREBOOM, LIVING WITHOUT FREE WILL 15886 (2001);
Oliver R. Goodenough & Kristin Prehn, A Neuroscientific Approach to
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scholarship concerned with criminal responsibility as of late
has invested heavily in the notion that the findings of biological
sciences promise a fundamental shift away from orthodox
notions of criminal liability.7 Some view the incorporation of
neuroscience within the law as a harbinger of change for
sentencing practices;8 others as a welcome aid in shifting
punishment away from a retributive-based enterprise to one
solely focused on future offender propensities;9 while still
others envision a dramatic diminution of the jury’s province.10
All share the belief that the impact of neuroscience on the law
in the coming years will be inevitable, dramatic, and will
fundamentally alter the way the law does business.11 And
nowhere is this promise endorsed with more gusto than in
discussions of responsibility and criminal liability.
Such renditions of culpability under this rubric of the
neuro-person are usually couched with the belief that
incorporating cognitive neuroscience into our legal institutions
Normative Judgment in Law and Justice, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL
SOC’Y B 1709, 1718–21 (2004) (describing how neuroscience will change
conceptions of morals, justice and normative judgment). But see Stephen J.
Morse, Brain and Blame 84 GEO. L.J. 527, 531 (1996) (describing the
“fundamental psycholegal error” of assuming causation equates to excuse for
matters of criminal culpability).
7. These views are undoubtedly embedded in a strict biological view of
personhood and personal agency that the law has long resisted. See, e.g., Owen
D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral Biology, 105 COLUM.
L. REV. 405, 419 (2005) (decrying “the near-total absence of recognition in
legal thinking that all behavior, and all the brain activity that perceives and
directs it, are fundamentally biological phenomena . . .”).
8. See Henry T. Greely, Neuroscience and Criminal Justice: Not
Responsibility but Treatment, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 1103, 1103–04 (2008)
(“[A]dvances in neuroscience will change, dramatically, the criminal justice
system . . . . [W]e may see major changes in how crimes are investigated, in
how trials are conducted, in how sentencing decisions are reached, and in
what kinds of sentences are imposed.”).
9. See Christopher Slobogin, The Civilization of the Criminal Law, 58
VAND. L. REV. 121, 157–65 (2005) (describing how neuroscience supports a
forward-oriented theory of criminal punishment).
10. See Julia Seaman, Black Boxes, 58 EMORY L.J. 427, 46675 (2008)
(arguing that neuroscience may supplant the juror’s role in determining
witness credibility and unveil the secrecy of juror decision-making).
11. The pace at which legal scholarship has embraced neurolaw is evident
in the numerous professional conferences, institutes, and large-scale projects
undertaken at various law schools. See Ken Strutin, Neurolaw and Criminal
Justice, LLRX.COM, Dec. 28, 2008, http://www.llrx.com/features/neurolaw.htm.
The title of one such conference held at the Sandra Day O’Connor College of
Law was telling: “The Law and Ethics of Brain Scanning: The Next Big Thing
Coming Soon to a Courtroom Near You?”

ERICKSON LF CHECK.WEB (DO NOT DELETE)

30

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

3/9/2010 11:40 AM

[Vol. 11:1

will lead to more just and compassionate outcomes for criminal
defendants.12 The idea that current regimes of culpability and
punishment are influenced imprudently by retributive
principles of justice looms large in the neurolaw discussion.13
Proponents of the neuro-person model suggest that blaming
people for behavior that is merely a product of their brains is
both foolish and unfair.14 If the brain and the mind are the
same and behavior is entirely determined a brain’s microevents, which are largely (if not entirely) automatic and
unconscious, then it follows that blame has no place in modern
conceptions of agency and criminal law. Indeed, the rise of the
neuro-person model coincides with the emergence of the
therapeutic justice movement, which seeks to supplant
traditional criminal punishment frameworks with behaviorbased interventional models of criminal justice under the idea
that criminal conduct is essentially a mental health
phenomenon.15 People commit crimes not because they are
12. See, e.g., PAUL M. CHURCHLAND, THE ENGINE OF REASON, THE SEAT
SOUL: A PHILOSOPHICAL JOURNEY INTO THE BRAIN 309 (1996) (“[W]e
are likely to see a revolution in the ways that society deals with the broad
spectrum of pathological social behavior. A neurally informed and
technologically sophisticated society will be able to make judgments reliably
and do things effectively, where the current practice is groping and
impotent.”); Jana L. Bufkin & Vickie R. Luttrel, Neuroimaging Studies of
Aggressive and Violence Behavior: Current Findings and Implications for
Criminology and Criminal Justice, 6 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE 176, 186
(2005)
Justice is typically defined as just deserts. As a result, legal variables
with no inherent explanatory worth are summoned to justify lessthan-stellar community-level interventions and unproductive
institutionalization. In contrast, the type of justice conceived in an
interdisciplinary program of study is rehabilitation oriented. Its
programs and policies are aimed at therapeutic justice.
Id.
13. At the heart of this argument is retribution’s focus on blame during
the commission of the crime compared to the forward-focused instrumentality
crime-control polices ostensibly provided by neuroscience-based conceptions of
agency which fix prediction of future harm, intervention, and incapacitation as
the preferred goals of criminal justice. See Greene & Cohen, supra note 3, at
1783–84; Slobogin, supra note 9, at 122.
14. See, e.g., Robert M. Sapolsky, The Frontal Cortex and the Criminal
Justice System, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y B 1787, 1794 (2004)
(“[A]lthough it may seem dehumanizing to medicalize people into being broken
cars, it can be vastly more humane than moralizing them into being sinners.”).
15. See GERRY JOHNSTONE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 94 (2002) (“Proponents
of therapeutic interventions regard much criminal behaviour as symptomatic
of underlying psychiatric disorder. . . .”).
OF THE
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motivated by greed or malice but because they are sick and in
need of treatmentthey have impaired brains.
But there are problems with the neuro-person model.
Despite the claim by neuroscientists that the mind is
accessible, measurable, and predictable, there are good reasons
for skepticism on all of these fronts. Cognitive neuroscience,
like all fields of science, utilizes assumptions to generate its
conclusions. Chief among these is that the complexity of the
mind can be understood by examining localized areas of the
brain which are presumed indicative of how people think. The
proliferation of various brain imaging technologies has
endowed the popular press and public with a powerful and
accessible model of the mind, which propagates this localization
view of mentation.16 This model has been augmented by an
abundance of highly publicized studies suggesting a link
between certain defined behaviors and some part of the brain
by way of impressive pictures of measured brain activity. Many
of these studies claim to have located areas of the brain
responsible for addiction,17 violence,18 wisdom,19 and even
morality.20 These exceedingly complex behaviors are said to
originate in highly defined, independent modules of cognitive
function located within specific regions of the brain. In a scant
twenty years, pictorial brain imaging has become common
parlance for understanding all aspects of human thought and

16. One study documented over 130 unique press articles covering brain
imaging between 1994–2004a number that has surely multiplied in
succeeding years. See Eric Racine et al., Brain Imaging: A Decade of Coverage
in the Print Media, 28 SCI. COMM. 122, 128 (2006); see also, e.g., Robert Lee
Hotz, The Brain, Your Honor, Will Take the Witness Stand, WALL ST. J., Jan.
16, 2009, at A7 (reporting on researchers who used a brain scanner to examine
how brain cells behave when assessing criminal responsibility and meting out
sentences); Jeffery Rosen, The Brain on the Stand: How Neuroscience is
Transforming the Legal System, N.Y. TIMES MAG., March 11, 2007, at 48
(reporting generally on how recent neuroscience discoveries is transforming
the legal system).
17. See, e.g., Rita Z. Goldstein et al., Subjective Sensitivity to Monetary
Gradients is Associated with Frontolimbic Activation to Reward in Cocaine
Abusers, 87 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 233 passim (2007).
18. See, e.g., Andreas Meyer-Lindenberg et al., Neural Mechanisms of
Genetic Risk for Impulsivity and Violence in Humans, 103 PROC.NAT’L ACAD.
SCI. U.S. 6269 passim (2006).
19. See, e.g., Thomas W. Meeks & Dilip V. Jeste, Neurobiology of Wisdom,
66 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 355 passim (2009).
20. See, e.g., Adrian Raine & Yaling Yang, Neural Foundations to Moral
Reasoning and Antisocial Behavior, 1 SOC. COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE
NEUROSCIENCE 203 passim (2006).
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behavior.
Indeed, there appears to be no limit to explaining all
aspects of humanity under the neuro-person model–only
technology limits its application. Yet it is inescapable that the
novel and powerful technology of brain imaging available to
neuroscientists invariably drives their conception of the mind.21
And that technology assumes that brains operate linearly, are
stable over time, and that behavior is predictable from localized
brain states. Much evidence abounds, however, that brains do
not operate in this fashion. Behavior and brains influence each
other; brains are dynamic and constantly in flux; and behavior
is the outcome of a range of responses to stimuli. Brain activity
is a global phenomenon, not merely a localized one within
compartments of the brain, even for simple behaviors.
Most cognitive neuroscience studies of higher ordered
behavior likewise assume a unidirectional view of behavior and
brain activity: localized electrical impulses within the brain
cause behavior, and therefore, bad behavior is always the
consequence of brain activity beyond the conscious control of
the person. Yet this view ignores a wealth of neuroscience
evidence which shows that brains are dynamic and malleable
with their structure and function readily changed by behavior
itself.22 To put it differently, behaviors influence brains
inasmuch as brains determine behavior. This more integrated
view of brains and behavior is of particular relevance to
questions of culpability and responsibility where it is often
assumed that a damaged brain should entail mitigation and
excuse. On the contrary, if behavior influences brain structure
and function, then under some circumstances, a damaged brain
may evince willful engagement in deleterious behavior.
This more nuanced view of the brain stands as a hurdle for
those who eagerly suggest dispensing with established
21. See WILLIAM R. UTTAL, NEUROSCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 15–26
(2009).
22. As it was once assumed brains did not change structurally or
functionally in adulthood, it is now understood that brains are constantly in
flux through a process known as neuroplasticity. See Schwartz et al., supra
note 4 passim; see generally Alvaro Pascual-Leone et al., The Plastic Human
Brain Cortex, 28 ANN. REV. NEUROSCIENCE 377, 378 (2005) (“[P]lasticity is an
intrinsic property of the nervous system retained throughout a lifespan
and . . . The brain, as the source of human behavior, is by design molded by
environmental changes and pressures, physiologic modifications, and
experiences.”).
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doctrines of culpability and responsibility. In their zeal to adopt
a culpability and punishment regime that relinquishes desert
in favor of incapacitation and prediction of future
dangerousness,23 those who embrace the neuro-person model
seem all too willing to accept a view of personhood that
invariably trivializes the ability of individuals to exert control
over their own behaviors in favor of one which reduces
humanity to the indiscriminate ebb and flow of chemicals
between neurons.24 The fact that even those chemical
messengers remain poorly understood appears to do little to
curb the enthusiasm for this breathtaking endeavor.25
And that enthusiasm seems odd given the implications of
the neuro-person model. While supporters grudgingly admit
that biological science has an ugly history when applied to the
law, few harbor fears that such mistakes would repeat
themselves.26 Instead, most neurolaw talk embraces the
promise of changing minds by changing brains through a
therapeutic model of criminal justice that views retributive
punishment as inhumane, but classifying and modifying brains
by their state as a great triumph of rehabilitation. As one
leading scholar suggested, there is no real difference between
prison and lobotomy.27
23. See, e.g., Slobogin, supra note 9, at 122 (“The criminal law ought to
embrace the dangerousness criterion, with the significant caveat that it do so
wholeheartedly. . . .”).
24. See generally Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 7, at 426 (“Synaptic
connections in the brain ebb and flow–not only over the course of a lifetime,
but during a single day.”). While Jones and Goldsmith are undoubtedly correct
in their assessment of synaptic physiology, this and similar biological facts do
not sufficiently explain why people behave as they do. Rather, they merely
describe physiological function. Cf. UTTAL, supra note 21, at 23–24 (detailing
the fallacy that description equates an explanation).
25. See, e.g., Theodore H. Bullock et al., The Neuron Doctrine, Redux, 310
SCI. 791, 792 (2005) (describing the shifting understanding of how
neurotransmitters contribute to neuronal communications). Bullock and
colleagues question “what features of the human brain account for our level of
behavioral complexity? It is doubtful that the answer emerges from knowing
the sheer number of cells, or the properties of synapses, or the identity of
neurotransmitters and modulators.” Id.
26. See Greely, supra note 8, at 1133 (“We should not view the fact that
these possible interventions would intervene directly in a subject’s brain as
necessarily disqualifying them. Many . . . justifications for criminal sanctions
work by affecting a criminal’s brain.”); Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 7, at
499 (acknowledging that science could be misapplied in a legal context, but
arguing that societal fears should not bar the sensible use of scientific
knowledge).
27. See Greely, supra note 8, at 1134 (“I see no qualitative difference
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This credulous fervor for neurolaw hides its secret
ambition. Those who view desert as an improvident distributive
theory of punishment are many, but few suggest dispensing
with the criminal justice system wholesale. Yet much of the
neuro-person model’s construction of culpability lies with the
view that crime itself is a mental illness and not behavior of
lawless citizens.28 They consider crime the product of impaired
brains and scientists are best suited for handling criminal
justice policy, not lawyers. Once crime is understood as a
behavioral problem rooted in the impaired brains of many
unfortunate citizens, ameliorating crime will properly involve
civil remedies instead of criminal ones. Therapeutic justice has
already made substantial inroads under the reasonable view
that criminal justice policy should encompass provisions which
reduce offender recidivism. But in doing so, therapeutic justice
seems all too eager in to jettison the adversarial system of
justice in place of one which values intervention at the cost of
adversarial rights and individual liberty by implementing
adjudication forums that greatly diminish zealous advocacy by
counsel. The very nature of the criminal justice system as one
entrenched in laws which restrain government is quite foreign
to therapeutic justice. And that is troublesome given the
reemergence of the therapeutic state.
The balance of this Article is organized as follows. Part II
explains the birth of neurolaw as a movement rooted in the
construction of the mind by cognitive neuroscience and
discusses the problems with that model of the mind. Part III
examines the ambition and consequence of these constituent
parts. The Conclusion offers some thoughts on neurolaw’s
implications.
II. THE BIRTH OF NEUROLAW
Neurolaw owes its fame to a modest and seemingly
between acting directly to change a criminal’s brain–through drugs, surgery,
DBS, or vaccines, if proven safe and effective–and acting indirectly–through
punishment, rehabilitation, cognitive therapy, parole conditions–to achieve
similar ends.”).
28. See generally ADRIAN RAINE, THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF CRIME:
CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR AS A CLINICAL DISORDER (1997) (discussing the
arguments and counterarguments for considering crime a disorder); Alec
Buchanan & Howard Zonana, Mental Disorder as the Cause of a Crime, 32
INT’L. J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 142, 142–43 (2009) (arguing that psychiatry
evidence should be used more in criminal proceedings).
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innocuous beginning. Lawyer J. Sherrod Taylor coined the term
during the early 1990s to describe the “converging courses” of
neuropsychology and the legal system.29 Adopted to explain the
growing influence of expert testimony by neuropsychologists in
brain-injury civil suits, neurolaw’s initial focus rested on
obtaining financial remedies for people with traumatic brain
injuries.30 As such, neurolaw had little ambition to modify
criminal law doctrine or add to the debates of culpability and
responsibility. Instead, neurolaw’s domain lay chiefly with
providing financial awards through civil litigation under the
principle that monetary gains improved clinical outcomes for
people with established brain injuries.31
But the allure of neurolaw from its conception was its
ability to describe personhood by reference to structural and
functional aspects of the brain. And this appeal was derived in
large measure by powerful new technologies which gave
unprecedented access to living brains. Brain imaging proved
immensely useful not only for scientific inquiry but because the
pictorial quality of the images it produced easily translated
brains into entities that were accessible to non-scientists.32
Even laypersons ponder at times how their brains manifest in
the material world. Brain imaging allowed the nonneuroscientist to peer inside the brain’s fantastic intricacy and
discern a rudimentary understanding of how the human

29. See J. Sherrod Taylor et al., Neuropsychologists and Neurolawyers, 5
NEUROPSYCHOL. 293, 293 (1991).
30. See J. Sherrod Taylor, Neurolaw: Towards a New Medical
Jurisprudence, 9 BRAIN INJ. 745, 746 (1995) (“The central thesis of neurolaw
proposes that financial resources obtained through civil justice remedies
contribute to improving the quality of life for persons with TBI [traumatic
brain injury] and their families.”).
31. See J. Sherrod Taylor, An Overview of Neurolaw for the Clinician:
What Every Potential Witness Should Know, 16 NEUROREHABILITATION 69, 69
(2001) (“[N]eurolaw provides that better legal outcomes promote better clinical
outcomes for patients with neurological injury.”).
32. Non-experts are more willing to find explanations accompanied by
brain images as more creditable. See David P. McCabe & Alan D. Castel,
Seeing Is Believing: The Effect of Brain Images on Judgments of Scientific
Reasoning, 107 COGNITION 343, 349–50 (2008). Even without pictures of the
brain, explanations prefaced by the words “neuroscience explains” persuade
people to accept causal events. See Deena Skolnick Weisberg et al., The
Seductive Allure of Neuroscience Explanations, 20 J. COGNITIVE
NEUROSCIENCE 470, 475 (2008) (finding that even irrelevant neuroscience
information leads non-experts to prefer and accept explanations of behavior
even when there are salient problems with the explanations as a whole).
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experience involves an organ weighing about 3 pounds.33
The ability of this new neuroscience to make the complex
simple is also what made it ideal for the law. Science and law
are often said to exist on different dimensions: law operates
chiefly through deduction, logic, and precedent; science is based
on the scientific method, which values empirical and
measurable phenomena as its centerpiece.34 As such, science is
increasingly multifaceted as the wealth of scientific information
is exponential: we know much more about the world now than
we did in the past. The consequence of this overflow of
information means that the nuances of scientific explanations
when applied to legal questions are often in tension with the
established precedents of legal doctrine.
The simplicity of brain scanning images promises to
overcome that difficulty. Ageless questions of how and why
people think and behave as they do are considered fully
explainable under the purview of neuroimaging by its
supporters. The access that neuroimaging provides to living
brains and the assumption that brain states equates all
mentation easily wed it to a variety of legal questions.35 Within
the past several years, that road has ventured to the
foundational tenets of responsibility and culpability. As
neurolaw questions the very idea that people can choose their
behavior, it inevitably questions the legitimacy and role of
punishment.
A. BRAINS WITHOUT MINDS
The draw of neurolaw is a gloss of intrigue and seduction.
Why people behave the way that they do is a perpetual and
universal question. That question has often been understood to
33. See PAUL GLEES, THE HUMAN BRAIN 102 (2005).
34. See Holloway v. United States, 148 F.2d 665, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1945)
(“The modern science of psychology is concerned with diagnosis and
therapeutics and not with moral judgments. It proceeds on an entirely
different set of assumptions [than the criminal law does].”); Gino C. Speranza,
The Medico-Legal Conflict over Mental Responsibility, 13 GREEN BAG 123,
124–25 (1901) (“[L]aw and medicine represent distinct currents or forces of
thought . . . .”).
35. Most scholarship has centered on the use of neuroimaging in
deception detection, yet there are numerous methodological problems with
even this straightforward use. See, Sean A. Spence, Playing Devil’s Advocate:
The Case Against fMRI Lie Detection, 13 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL.
11, 22–24 (2008).
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entail some subjectivity across individuals and cultures.36
Beyond the basilar needs of appetites and social bonding,
diverging views of what causes people to behave as they do are
copious and disputed.37 Even within the behavioral sciences,
there is much disagreement about why people behave as they
do. For many years, the Freudians persuaded scientists and
non-experts alike that behavior was the product of
psychosexual drives established mostly during early childhood
under the command of an immaterial unconsciousness.38 In
succeeding years, behaviorism proposed that external
behaviors were the mind and that the mechanics operating
within the brain were irrelevant.39 Other theories abound but
most hold to the immutable premise that people direct their
behavior at least some of the time. Even under the subterfuge
of the unconscious, psychoanalysis claimed that people acted
because they had reasonseven when they were unaware of
them.
The path of cognitive neuroscience stands in contrast. The
foundational walls upon which it rests hold unwaveringly to
the tenets of classical physics, reductive materialism, and hard
determinism. Implicit in this model is the notion that, in time,
all human experiences will be accessible by various physical
apparatuses designed to explore the brain, that all mentation
will be measurable by these devices, and that accurate
predictions of future behavior by way of brain activity can be
made solely by understanding the material properties of the
brain.40 While alternative psychological theories hold to some of
these premises, cognitive neuroscience confidently suggests our
perception of personhood grounded in the sense that we choose
how to act is false and untenable.41 Instead we are automatons,

36. See Paulo Sousa, On Folk Conceptions of Mind, Agency and Morality,
6 J. COGNITION & CULTURE 1 (2006) (discussing the connection between folk
conceptions of mind, agency, and morality and scientific scrutiny of those
conceptions).
37. Id. at 9–14 (discussing different scholars’ interpretations of the folk
concept of free will).
38. See STEPHEN A. MITCHELL & MARGARET J. BLACK, FREUD AND
BEYOND 13–22 (1995).
39. See WILLIAM M. BAUM, UNDERSTANDING BEHAVIORISM31–40 (1994).
40. See Greene & Cohen, supra note 3, at 1781.
41. Id. at 1775 (“Cognitive neuroscience, by identifying the specific
mechanisms responsible for behaviour, will vividly illustrate what until now
could only be appreciated through esoteric theorizing: that there is something
fishy about our ordinary conceptions of human action and responsibility.”).
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fooled by a belief in goal-directed behavior that we perceive is
under our control but is entirely the product of forces set into
motion long before our existence.42 That we may believe that
we prefer and choose to indulge in chocolate ice-cream over
vanilla is an illusion; instead, we are a passive audience to the
electrical cadence of neuronal firings buried deep within our
heads.43
But even that view would not be correct according to the
adherents of the neuroscience model of humanity. As many
prominent neuroscientists have claimed, there is no “you” as is
commonly understood: The brain and the mind are
synonymous.44 As such, the very idea that we are passive
observers of our determined mind is fallacious. What we
perceive as the mind is nothing more than a cognitive
adaptation established by our brains to allow higher-ordered
behavior.45 That our brains engage in behavior before we
become consciously aware of it means behavior operates
independently from our consciousness.46 At the least we are
42. See id. at 1777. But see LEWIS F. PETRINOVICH, HUMAN EVOLUTION,
REPRODUCTION, AND MORALITY 112–15 (1995) (discussing problems with
genetic determinism when applied to evolutionary psychology); Schwartz et
al., supra note 4, at 1313–15 (2005) (arguing that a strict determinist view of
behavior is incompatible with quantum physics).
43. See Martha J. Farah & Andrea S. Heberlein, Personhood and
Neuroscience: Naturalizing or Nihilating?, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Jan. 2007, at 37,
40 (“The real contribution of neuroscience to understanding personhood may
be in revealing not what persons are, but rather why we have the intuition
that there are persons. . . . [P]ersonhood is illusory, constructed by our brains
and projected onto the world.”); see generally DANIEL M. WEGNER, THE
ILLUSION OF CONSCIOUS WILL 2–28 (2003) (debating the existence of free will
versus determinism).
44. See CRICK, supra note 5, at 3; Greene & Cohen, supra note 3, at
17789.
45. See COLIN BLAKEMORE, THE MIND MACHINE 270 (1988) (“We feel
ourselves, usually, to be in control of our actions, but that feeling is itself a
product of the brain. . . .”).
46. This refers to the famous experiment that purported to show that the
motor cortex is activated several hundreds of milliseconds before subjects
become aware of their desire to act. Benjamin Libet et al., Time of Conscious
Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral Activity (Readiness-Potential),
106 BRAIN 623, 63536 (1983). But see HENRIK WALTER, NEUROPHILOSOPHY
OF FREE WILL 250–52 (Cynthia Klohr trans., 2001) (discussing criticisms of
Libet’s interpretation of the experimental findings); Jing Zhu, Reclaiming
Volition: An Alternative Interpretation of Libet’s Experiment, 10 J.
CONSCIOUSNESS STUD. 61, 67–74 (2003) (providing an alternative
interpretation of Libet’s results based on artifacts in Libet’s experimental
design and on the results of experiments by other investigators).
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fools under the direction of our selfish genes;47 at the worst our
identity is utterly an illusion.48 The very notion of human
agencythat people evaluate their environments, make
choices, and impose those choices in the worldis entirely
incompatible with the cognitive neuroscience theory of
personhood.49 And that view has serious implications for
theories of culpability and responsibility so fundamentally
rooted in most legal systems.
The very idea that people are mere passive observers of the
world in which they occupy is no recent development.50 And
while most people scoff at the idea that they have little, if any,
control over their own behavior, Western culture has subtly
trended towards that idea for many decades. Our modern
culture is replete with notions of everyday behavior as products
of addictions and compulsions. The very idea that how people
think and evaluate the world is influencedoften quite
stronglyby unconscious biases or motivations is a direct
descendent of modernity’s infatuation with behavioral science
explanations of humanity. Irrespective of the veracity of this
view, it is undeniable that modern culture looks first to
psychologists and psychiatrists when seeking explanations for
why people behave badly.51
Indeed, mental health professionals have made
tremendous inroads in how most people think about the mind
and behavior. In many ways, this is beneficial insofar as
modern society has accommodated the view that people can
change their unwanted behavior or relinquish their mental
suffering by seeking professional mental health treatment.
Likewise, there is a greater understanding that our brains do
matter in terms of how our minds operate. Those who bear
substantial brain defects are considered unlucky inhabitants of
a broken physical body and not the wellspring of malevolent
47. See RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE passim (1976).
48. See Farah & Heberlein, supra note 43, at 45 (“[P]ersonhood is a kind
of illusion.”).
49. See Steven P.R. Rose, Human Agency in the Neurocentric Age, 6
EMBO REP. 1001, 1001 (2005).
50. For an overview of theory of determinism see Peter Van Inwagen, The
Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism, 27 PHIL. STUD. 185, 18588
(1975).
51. Perhaps the best example of this phenomenon is the numerous expert
commentaries that are sought by the popular press when a heinous crime is
committed. See, e.g., Susan Hansen, The Mind of a Killer, SALON, Jul. 27,
2001, http://www.salon.com/books/int/2001/07/27/killers/.
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forces or descendents of cruel or indifferent parents.52 Modern
psychotherapy and biological psychiatry have undoubtedly
improved the lives of many simply because they offer hope
through treatment to those whose prognosis decades ago would
have been very poor.
But there is a dark side to this fascination with behavioral
science. As there remains no definitive laboratory test for most
mental disorders, their presence is assessed solely by
descriptions written and endorsed by mental health
professionals. That is, illnesses such as depression or anxiety
are not diagnosed by a laboratory test of brain pathology,
rather they are declared so based upon diagnostic descriptions
of behaviors and reported emotional states.53 Thus, someone is
diagnosed with clinical depression when she reports feeling sad
most days, cannot concentrate, and appears to engage in tasks
with undue torpidity. This process is hardly unusual in
medicine as many diagnoses begin with a clinical interview of
reported symptoms by the patient. Yet behavioral science is
vastly different because in most instances that is where the
process ends. Despite the promise of bio-markers, genetic
testing, and brain imaging, mental health practice is nearly
devoid of these purposed confirmatory tools.54 And while many
are confident that technology will eventually overcome this
limitation,55 technology is unlikely to tell us what constitutes a
normal mind.
The perennial question of what defines a normal mind
scarcely constricts the continued encroachment of diagnostic
labels for an endless number of behaviors and mental states.
52. Many influential authors during the zenith of psychodynamic thought
concluded that parental behavior resulted in mental illness in
childrenincluding psychosis. See, e.g., THEODORE LIDZ ET AL.,
SCHIZOPHRENIA AND THE FAMILY 1519, 42830 (1965).
53. A somewhat immoderate version of this thesis was famously
introduced many decades ago in the wake of revelations that Russian
psychiatrists often abused the powers of psychiatry to quell political
dissidents. See THOMAS S. SZASZ, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS 1–15, 62–72
(1961).
54. See Ed Bullmore et al., Why Psychiatry Can’t Afford to be
Neurophobic, 194 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 293, 295 (2009) (stating that there is
currently “no clear role for neuroimaging, biomarkers or genetic testing” in
clinical psychiatry).
55. See Peter Tyrer, Civil War Psychiatry, 194 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 386,
386 (2009) (claiming “in 20 years time it may be very different” in terms of the
clinical application of neuroimaging, biomarkers, and genetic testing).
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Over roughly the past fifty years, the number of official
diagnosable mental disorders has increased by almost 300%.56
That number will surely grow with the forthcoming fifth
edition of the official diagnostic manual57aided by the
contributions of neuroscience.58 Much of this growth can be
attributed to the classification of behaviors once considered
indicative of poor character or the willful immoderation of illicit
passions. Intemperance, pride, and gluttony are no longer
personal flaws deserving of shame but symptoms of intermentexplosive disorder,59 Narcissistic Personality Disorder,60 and
the various eating disorders requiring professional treatment.61
An inappropriate concern with eating healthy foods is now
indicative of a metal disorder.62 So too, are a host of behaviors
centered on poor self-control: overuse of the internet,63
excessive sun-tanning,64 and indulgent cell phone use65 are

56. See Steven K. Erickson, The Myth of Mental Disorder:
Transsubstantive Behavior and Taxometric Psychiatry, 41 AKRON L. REV. 67,
113–14 (2008)
57. See Roger K. Blashfield & Kenneth A. Fuller, Predicting the DSM-V,
184 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 4 (1996) (predicting 1,800 unique
diagnostic criteria for the new edition based on growth from prior editions).
58. See generally Steven E. Hyman, Can Neuroscience Be Integrated into
the DSM-V?, 8 NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE 725, 72831 (2007) (arguing
that neuroscience will and should influence the forthcoming psychiatric
diagnostic manual).
59. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
FOR MENTAL DISORDERS FOURTH EDITION: TEXT REVISION 663–67 (4th ed.
2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV REVISION].
60. Id. at 714–17.
61. Id. at 583–95.
62. See L. M. Donini et al., Orthorexia Nervosa: A Preliminary Study With
a Proposal for Diagnosis and an Attempt to Measure the Dimension of the
Phenomenon, 9 EATING & WEIGHT DISORDERS 151, 151 (2004).
63. See Jerald J. Block, Issues for DSM-V: Internet Addiction, 165 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 306 (2008) (arguing that internet addiction is associated with
tolerance and withdrawal symptoms and that it should be included in DSMV). But see Nicki A. Dowling & Kelly L. Quirk, Screening for Internet
Dependence: Do the Proposed Diagnostic Criteria Differentiate Normal from
Dependent Internet Use?, 12 CYBERPSYCHOL. & BEHAV. 21, 22 (2009)
(suggesting that current methods for diagnosing internet addiction do not
discriminate normal from abnormal users).
64. See Molly M. Warthan et al., UV Light Tanning as a Type of
Substance-Related Disorder, 141 ARCHIVES DERMATOLOGY 963, 965 (2005)
(arguing that excessive sunbathing is an addiction and should be regulated by
the law).
65. See Lauren D. LaPorta, Cellular Telephones: A New Addiction?,
TIMES,
Oct.
1,
2006,
PSYCHIATRIC
http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/display/article/10168/52076?pageNumber=1.
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considered forms of addictions necessitating inventions by
mental health professionals. Very few people escape the
increasing reach of psychiatric diagnostic classification. In a
few short decades, we all have become mentally unsound.
B. THE WAY OF COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE
Cognitive neuroscience can be defined as an investigative
field that seeks to understand how the mind arises from the
central nervous system, in particular the brain.66 It bridges the
fields of cognitive science, psychology, and biology by focusing
on the biological mechanisms underlying cognition, with a
specific focus on the neural substrates of mental processes and
their behavioral manifestations.67 It claims to answer how
psychological and cognitive capacities are produced by the
structure and function of neural networks within primates.68 It
is premised on the idea that all aspects of mentation are
entirely reducible to material terms and these elements are
measurable in ways that provide meaningful insights into the
origin of behaviors.69 It assumes that measured brain states
can be used not only to understand how brain activity becomes
behavior, but that such information can be generalized across
all brains to arrive at a unified understanding of human
mentation.70 To put it differently, cognitive neuroscience
asserts that all individual thoughts, emotions, and feelings can
be traced to certain defined biological locations of the brain.71
Moreover, these measurements can be used to discern how all
brains operate and how to build models which predict future
mental activity and behavior.72
It is hard to imagine the domain of cognitive neuroscience
without reference to the various brain imaging technologies

66. See HOWARD S. KIRSHNER, BEHAVIORAL NEUROLOGY 5 (2d ed. 2002).
67. See id. at 45.
68. See generally David Wells, Book Review, 122 BRAIN 2413 passim
(1999) (reviewing RANDOLPH W. PARKS ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF NEURAL
NETWORK MODELING: NEUROPSYCHOLOGY AND COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE
(1999)) (overviewing a textbook that explains neural network modeling).
69. See Martha J. Farah, Neuroethics: The Practical and the
Philosophical, 9 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 34, 34 (2005).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 38.
72. Id.
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that it so frequently utilizes to arrive at its conclusions.73 These
technologies have greatly enhanced the ability of scientists to
investigate the structure and function of the living brain. The
principal technology that cognitive neuroscience uses is
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), which began to
dominate the field of brain mapping during the 1990s.74 Like
its predecessor, structural magnetic resonance imaging (MRI),
fMRI uses a powerful magnetic field known as Larmor
precession to affect the water molecules within cells.75 While
the technical details of brain imaging are beyond the scope of
this article, the key difference between structural and
functional MRI lies in what they purport to measure and
explain. As its name implies, structural MRI provides images of
brain structure, that is, how the brain is organized by its
constituent parts.76 The pictures provided by structural MRI
conform to what is understood about how the brain is
constructed and organized when it is dissected at autopsy.77
The chief advantage of structural MRI is, of course, that it
provides an examination of structure inside living brains. In
contrast, functional MRI claims to show how brains function
and work.78 As such, the latter imposes two significant
assumptions absent from the former. First, since there are no
definitive or universal rules about how the brain becomes the
mind,79 fMRI utilizes technologically convenient assumptions
about brain function to arrive at its end product.80 Second,
there are no alternative mechanisms equivalent to autopsy
73. For example, a recent review discovered approximately 19,000 peerreviewed articles involving fMRI technology since 1991, corresponding to over
three papers per day. Nikos K. Logothetis, What We Can Do and What We
Cannot Do with fMRI, 453 NATURE 869, 869 (2008).
74. See id.
75. RAY H. HASHEMI, ET AL., MRI: THE BASICS 26 (2003).
76. See DONALD W. MCROBBIE ET AL., MRI: FROM PICTURE TO PROTON 1
(2003).
77. See id.
78. MCROBBIE ET AL., supra note 76, at 333.
79. See Stephen J. Morse, Determinism and the Death of Folk Psychology:
Two Challenges to Responsibility from Neuroscience, 9 MINN. J. L. SCI. &
TECH. 1, 20 (2008) (“We do not know how the brain enables the mind . . . .”);
UTTAL, supra note 21, at 27 (“The mind, however difficult it may be to define,
is widely agreed to be the outcome of complex information processing
associated with the brain . . . . [M]ost scientists and philosophers also agree
that how this is accomplished remains mysterious and unknown.”).
80. WILLIAM R. UTTAL, THE NEW PHRENOLOGY: THE LIMITS OF
LOCALIZING COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN THE BRAIN 136 (2001) [hereinafter
UTTAL, LOCALIZING].
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dissection to validate the findings of fMRI. Hence, it remains
difficult, if not impossible, to replicate fMRI findings outside of
the purview of the brain imaging machine. Thus, there is a leap
of faith built into the brain imaging framework when we accept
its conclusions regarding the operations of the mind. Since
cognitive neuroscience is ultimately interested in how the mind
operates through the brain,81 the assumptions built into the
fMRI model matter immensely as fMRI is the workhorse of the
field.
A fundamental attribute of the fMRI technique holds that
understanding the complexity of mentation is possible by
reducing the operation of the brain to multiple quasiindependent cognitive modules.82 For instance, sight is
assigned to regions of the brain believed responsible for
generating and regulating vision, bodily movement to areas
involved with motor control, and so forth.83 Consequently, when
researchers want to explore how people see something, they
examine those parts of the brain which are believed involved
with sight and usually exclude other regions of the brain. The
images produced by the fMRI technique rest upon the notion
that subtracting fMRI data at different time points from areas
of the brain presumed to be involved with particular elements
of thinking and behavior reveals meaningful differences
between brain states that conveys valuable information about
human mentation.84 That is, functional brain imaging concerns
81. See Greene & Cohen, supra note 3, at 1781 (“There are many causes
that impinge on behaviour, but all of them—from the genes you inherited, to
the pain in your lower back, to the advice your grandmother gave you when
you were six—must exert their influence though the brain.”).
82. Known as “localization,” this theory is the backbone of cognitive
neuroscience and holds that mental functions are carried out by particular
brain structures. See EDWIN CLARKE ET AL., The Genesis of Cortical
Localization, in AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF BRAIN FUNCTION 115, 11528
(1996); cf. WILLIAM R. UTTAL, NEURAL THEORIES OF MIND 116 (2005)
[hereinafter UTTAL THEORIES] (“On the psychological side, it is not at all
certain that cognitive modules exist.”); Logothetis, supra note 73, at 869 (“[A]
frequently made assumption is that the mind can be subdivided into modules
or parts whose activity can then be studied with fMRI. If this assumption is
false, then even if the brain’s architecture is modular, we would never be able
to map mind modules onto brain structures . . . .”).
83. JOSEPH E. LEDOUX, THE EMOTIONAL BRAIN: THE MYSTERIOUS
UNDERPINNINGS OF EMOTIONAL LIFE 7677 (1996).
84. Brain imaging uses the technique of generating differences between
groups by subtracting brain activation patterns to arrive at its conclusion of
individual differences. For an overview, see Matthew B. Crawford, The Limits
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itself with the idea that areas of the brain that consume more
oxygenated blood than others do while performing a task
discloses how people think.85 This theory of brain activity is
harmonious with the structural conception of the brain
whereby different areas of the brain control different activities.
Thus, the frontal lobe of the brain is considered involved with
conscious thought,86 the temporal lobe with smell87 and sound,
and the pituitary with hormone regulation.88 Modern
neuroscience arrived at this global understanding of brain
function mainly by observing functional and behavioral deficits
among those with brain injury.89 Those who, for instance, suffer
from traumatic damage to the occipital lobe frequently endure
visual impairments, including hallucinations or even
blindness.90
When neuroscience explores functions such as sight, smell,
or motor coordination, it operates under the reasonable
assumption that outward behavior is the product of brain
activity controlled by specific regions of the brain. But the chief
interest of cognitive neuroscience lies beyond observable
behavior.
Instead
of
explaining
behavior,
cognitive
neuroscience seeks to understand how people think. To
accomplish this feat, it must employ experiments which assume
of Neuro-Talk, 19 NEW ATLANTIS, Winter 2008, at 65, 70-72. These group
differences often obscure tremendous variations among the individual
subjects. See Michael B. Miller et al., Extensive Individual Differences in Brain
Activations Associated with Episodic Retrieval Are Reliable over Time, 14 J.
COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 1200, 120911 (2002). Additionally, the
calculations used with this technique have recently been criticized for
generating inflated estimates of significance. See Edward Vul et al., Puzzlingly
High Correlations in fMRI Studies of Emotion, Personality, and Social
Cognition, 4 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 274 passim (2009); Nikolaus
Kriegeskorte et al., Circular Analysis in Systems Neuroscience: The Dangers of
Double Dipping, 12 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 535 passim (2009).
85. It is worth noting that only recently was it discovered that cells in the
brain were responsible for the increased blood flow measured by fMRI. See
James Schummers et al., Turned Responses of Astrocytes and Their Influence
on Hemodynamic Signals in the Visual Cortex, 320 SCI 1638 (2008).
86. KIRSHNER, supra note 66, at 2223.
87. EVIAN GORDON, INTEGRATIVE NEUROSCIENCE: BRINGING TOGETER
BIOLOGICAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND CLINICAL MODELS OF THE HUMAN BRAIN
182 (2000).
88. Marianne B. Müller et al., Genetics of Endocrine—Behavior
Interactions, in 5 HORMONES, BRAIN, AND BEHAVIOR 263 (Donald W. Pfaff ed.,
2002).
89. See GORDON, supra note 87.
90. See ORRIN DEVINSKY & MARK D’ESPOSITO, NEUROLOGY OF COGNITIVE
AND BEHAVIORAL DISORDERS 13238 (2004).
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that complex human thoughts are reducible to independent
modules located in specific areas of the brain.91 Thus, cognitive
neuroscience claims that when one is faced with an important
moral dilemma, such as whether to pull a lever to divert a
trolley car and save many lives at the expense of killing
another,92 how one thinks about such morally impinged
matters can be entirely understood by examining brain activity
in certain sections of the brain.93 Yet this approach assumes
that such complex thoughts are accessible and readily
explained by the technology employed by the neuroscientist.
Determining which areas of the brain are responsible for such
higher-ordered, and presumably uniquely human mentation, is
largely a matter of reliance on three factors: (1) anecdotal
evidence from brain injury victims, (2) observations of people
under the effects of psychoactive chemicals, (3) and highlycontrived experiments conducted within the confines of fMRI
laboratories.
1. Reduction and Deduction
Anecdotal evidence of brain function related to higher
cognitive processes comes from retrospective studies that link
severe and substantial brain damage to observed behavior.94
Perhaps the most famous example of this phenomenon was the
nineteenth century case of Phineas Gage, a law-abiding railway
91. See UTTAL, LOCALIZING, supra note 80, at 99110; see also Daniel T.
Willingham & Elizabeth W. Dunn, What Neuroimaging and Brain
Localization Can Do, Cannot Do, and Should Not Do for Social Psychology, 85
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 662, 66768 (2003) (describing the difficulty
of localizing social psychology constructs).
92. This, of course, refers to the legendary trolley car dilemma. See
PHILIPPA FOOT, VIRTUES AND VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL PHIL. 19,
2024 (1978); see also Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Trolley Problem, 94 YALE L.
J. 1395 passim (1985) (providing an extended discussion of the dilemma);
Joshua D. Greene et al., An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in
Moral Judgment, 293 SCI. 2105 passim (2001) (investigating emotional
processing areas of the brain using the trolley car dilemma and fMRI).
93. Cf.Steven Pinker, The Moral Instinct, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 13, 2008,
at 3234 (“The human moral sense turns out to be an organ of considerable
complexity, with quirks that reflect its evolutionary history and its
neurobiological foundations.”).
94. See, e.g., Thomas C. Neylan, Frontal Lobe Function: Mr. Phineas
Gage’s Famous Injury, 11 J. NEUROPSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE
280, 280 (1999) (explaining how a physician used Phineas Gage’s injury and
reported personality changes to advance the idea of cerebral localization in the
1800s).
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worker who suffered a severe brain injury when an iron
tapping rod was driven though a large portion of his frontal
lobes.95 After the accident, Gage’s behavior was erratic and
callous; friends who knew him noted his changed personality
despite his largely preserved cognitive abilities.96 Gage’s injury
in many ways was a watershed moment in medicine. It prodded
a skeptical medical community to conclude that personality,
behavior, and the brain were inextricably linked.97 It also
hastened the view that intrinsic elements of personality and
behavior were localized within discrete areas of the brain and
laid open the possibility that surgical intervention could
radically
alter
sensation,
perception,
behaviorand
presumably thoughts as well.98 The hunt for connections
between brain regions and defined behavior was launched; and
that pursuit continues with vigor to this day.99
Much like the discoveries surrounding Phineas Gage,
serendipity played a large role in revealing how psychoactive
chemicals affect behavior. From the late nineteenth century
through the 1930s, a number of French and German scientists
were searching for new types of dyes to stain slides for
microscopes.100 These phenothiazine dyes were noted for their
various medicinal properties, including the treatment of
malaria during World War I, when the traditional quinine
treatment became unavailable due to military blockades.101 In
the 1930s, phenothiazines were explored for their possible
antihistaminic properties in an effort to discover new
treatments for surgical shock.102 After several formulations, the
95. James M. Harlow, Letter to the Editor, Passage of an Iron Bar
Through the Head, 39 BOSTON MED. & SURGICAL J. 38993 (1848), reprinted in
11 J. NEUROPSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 281, 28183 (1999).
96. See Neylan, supra note 94.
97. See MALCOLM MACMILLAN, AN ODD KIND OF FAME 4145 (2002).
98. Id. at 12542, 20550. As might be expected, the lobotomy procedure
was a direct descendent of this insight into brains, behavior and surgical
intercession. See Robert P. Feldman & James T. Goodrich, Psychosurgery: A
Historical Overview, 48 NEUROSURGERY 647, 64954 (2001).
99. See Logothetis, supra note 73, at 869, 870 (claiming that about half of
the 19,000 peer-reviewed papers utilizing fMRI technology explored
“functional localization,” of which many used lower powered fMRI magnets
prone to “localization errors”).
100. See Francisco López-Muñoz et al., History of the Discovery and
Clinical Introduction of Chlorpromazine, 17 ANNALS OF CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY
113, 114 (2005).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 116.
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drug chlorpromazine was discovered and used in surgery by a
French army surgeon named Henri-Marie Lamborit.103
Lamborit noted that chlorpromazine was a highly effective
sedative and soon suggested to his psychiatric colleagues that
they try it with psychiatric patients.104 Its effect was
monumental. Chlorpromazine would become the first effective
psychiatric medicine and was largely responsible for the
massive decline of institutional state asylums during the
1960s.105 Exploring the mechanisms behind chlorpromazine
and
similar
drugs
led
to
understanding
that
neurotransmittersthe chemical messengers of neural
tissuecan be affected by drugs to produce profound
behavioral changes in people.106 Those changes can both
produce beneficial and horrific behaviors and suggest that
behavior is directly linked with the chemistry of the brain.
Those effects also imply that behavior results from the actions
of neural mechanisms within defined regions of the brain.
The spate of brain imaging studies that claim to identify
regions of the brain responsible for character, love, morality,
and other human attributes also rely upon the premise that
localized areas of the brain are responsible for human
behaviors.107 Many of these studies depend on comparisons
between people with known brain injuries and those with no
record or indication of brain injury. For instance, numerous
studies have suggested that one areathe ventromedial
prefrontal cortex (VMPC)is predominantly responsible for
moral behavior in humans.108 These studies draw their
conclusions by having subjects engage in simplified tasks or
merely having them observe visual stimuli within the housing
of the fMRI machine. For instance, one typical study asked
subjects to choose between two given alternatives in a series of
103. Id. at 11626.
104. Id. at 118.
105. See id. at 128.
106. See Solomon H. Snyder et al., Drugs, Neurotransmitters, and
Schizophrenia, 184 SCI. 1243 (1974).
107. See Martha J. Farah & Nancy Murphy, Neuroscience and the Soul,
323 SCI. 1168, 1168 (2009) (“[A]s neuroscience begins to reveal the
mechanisms underlying personality, love, morality, and spiritualty, the idea of
a ghost in the machine becomes strained. Brain imaging indicates that all of
these traits have physical correlates in brain function.”).
108. See, e.g., Michael Koenigs et al., Damage to the Prefrontal Cortex
Increases Utilitarian Moral Judgments, 446 NATURE 908, 90810 (2007).
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hypothetical moral dilemmas.109 The type of dilemmas used in
these studies range from choosing environmental polices based
on mortality calculations to cheating on one’s taxes, to
smothering a crying baby to prevent discovery of a group of
people hiding from enemy soldiers.110 Another study scanned
subjects’ brains while they observed emotionally laden facial
features projected on to a television screen inside the fMRI
apparatus.111 Still another study examined probabilistic
judgments in children assessed as having psychopathic traits
while scanning their brains.112 While the methods of these
studies differ, all of the studies claim to link impaired moral
judgment and emotional regulation based on differences in
purported measured brain activity. Moreover, they all propose
that the results generated by these tightly controlled studies,
which take place in the unnatural environment of the fMRI
machine, elucidate more generally how people behave in the
world under the demands of everyday life.113 Despite the small
sample sizes used in these studies, primarily ranging from ten
to twenty subjects,114 supporters ardently suggest that these
differences in brain activity demonstrate the root origin of
behavior and thought.115 Thus, moral thinking and behavior is
109. Id. at 108.
110. See Joshua D. Greene et al., Supplement Data: The Neural Bases of
Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment, 14 NEURON S1, S34
(2004),
http://download.cell.com/neuron/mmcs/journals/08966273/PIIS0896627304006348.mmc1.pdf
111. See Andrea S. Heberlein et al., Ventromedial Frontal Lobe Plays a
Critical Role in Facial Emotion Recognition, 20 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCI. 721,
72324 (2008).
112. See Elizabeth C. Finger et al., Abnormal Ventromedial Prefrontal
Cortex Function in Children with Psychopathic Traits During Reversal
Learning, 65 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 586, 587–89 (2008).
113. See generally Andrew Scull, Minds, Brains, Law, and Culture, 130
BRAIN 585, 589 (2007) (book review) (“[J]ust as economists traditionally rely
upon absurdly oversimplified portraits of human motivation to construct their
models, so all the neuroscientific findings that are so proudly proffered reflect
simple simulated experiments that in no way capture the intricacies of
everyday social situations . . . .”).
114. A recent commentary suggests that these small sample sizes greatly
inflate the statistical findings in these studies. See Tal Yarkoni, Big
Correlations in Little Studies: Inflated fMRI Correlations Reflect Low
Statistical Power—Commentary on Vul et al. (2009), 4 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL.
SCI. 294 passim (2009).
115. But see Greg Miller, Growing Pains for fMRI, 320 SCI. 1412, 1413
(2008) (reviewing criticisms of the moral dilemma fMRI studies and noting
that “some of the ‘emotional’ brain regions in the morality study have also
been connected to memory and language—a caveat that is rarely mentioned in
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merely a product of neuronal discharges inside the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex of the brainand nothing
more.116 They are, as two preeminent neuroscientists put it
recently, “not mere correlates but are the physical bases of
these aspects of our personhood.”117
2. The Life of the Brain
The evidence that neuroscience marshals in favor of its
explanation of higher-ordered behavior is striking. Few would
seriously contend that modern understandings of behavior have
not advanced immensely by examining the principal proxy of
behavior which is the brain. Yet the relationship between
brains, behavior, and minds is highly intimate and masked.118
It is not at all clear that mentation can be reduced in any
meaningful fashion by merely describing the activation
patterns of neuronal tissue.119 While neuroscientists would
media coverage . . . .”).
116. The proponents of this neurocentric view suggest these findings are
fundamentally important when examining normative ethics as well. See, e.g.,
Joshua Greene, From Neural ‘Is’ to Moral ‘Ought’: What Are the Moral
Implications of Neuroscientific Moral Psychology?, 4 NATURE REVS. NEUROSCI.
847, 847 (2003) (“[S]cientific facts can have profound moral implications
and . . . moral philosophers have paid too little attention to relevant work in
the natural sciences.”).
117. Farah & Murphy, supra note 107, at 1168.
118. As Nobel prize winning scientist Max Delbrück put it in a quote
loosely attributed to him: “So far as I can tell, our science simply has no
handle whatever on the most conspicuous and immediate reality of our lives:
that we are aware.” See MAX DELBRÜCK, MIND FROM MATTER? 159 (1986).
“When I was a student in Gödttingen, there appeared a story in the
newspaper about a rabbit that had been frozen and then brought back
to life. Although the report of this cryogenic feat was probably a
sensationalist fabrication, someone was inspired by this story to ask
various people what they would ask about if they had been frozen for
500 years and then revived.” My own priorities come to mind with
crashing immediacy: “Has a machine yet been made that has
awareness, a synthetic consciousness? Is there any agreed-upon way
yet to detect and measure the quality, or even the existence, of an
object’s consciousness?”
Id.
119. See Scull, supra note 113, at 589.
Much is made of the fact that particular regions of the brain show
heightened levels of activity on fMRIs when people, for example, are
making choices, or telling lies. . . . [S]uch correlations prove nothing
about the causal process involved, any more than . . . the existence of
a particular sequence of events demonstrates that some early event in
the sequence ineluctably caused the a later event. Post hoc ergo
propter hoc is an elementary logical fallacy.
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have us believe that their brain activity measurements equate
an adequate and sufficient detailing of the mind, the
impressive images upon which their persuasion relies runs
counter to the tremendous complexity of brain anatomy and
function. “With 1010 neurons and 1014 connections in the
[human] cortex alone,” the human brain defies any simple
mechanical explanation.120 Much of the workings of the brain
are breathtakingly beautiful, mysterious, and continue to
confound researchers despite their dogged attempts to dissect
and translate its processes. Even the technology used to
generate functional brain images remains clouded in obscurity,
as many of the fundamental technicalities remain poorly
understood.121
More importantly, the underlying cognitive processes and
mechanisms which cognitive neuroscience seeks to explain are
neither directly observable nor measurable. That is, mentation
is not measured by the neuroscientist; brain activity is.122 As
such, when the neuroscientist claims to measure “moral
thinking,” what is measured are regions of brain activation
believed to be associated with thinking about moral problems.
But in describing that process, neuroscience has not yet
explained how molecular brain activity becomes thoughts about
morality. It is not as though neuroscience has any instrument
known as a “moral thought” aperture. Instead, it has
sophisticated tools which measure the proxy of thoughts, which
is brain activity. Putting aside the endless debate of dualism
between mind and brain, what matters in terms of
understanding
cognitive
neuroscience’s
many
claims
surrounding measured mentation is the simple fact that, as of
yet, we have no idea how the brain becomes the mind.123
Describing brain molecular activity does little to advance that
understanding.124 At the most, brain imaging tells us what
Id.
120. See Logothetis, supra note 73, at 87172.
121. A number of articles have illuminated the limitations of fMRI
technologies, ranging from measurement and the physiology of the brain to
statistical analysis of the data to the underlying scientific assumptions used.
See e.g., id. passim; Vul, supra note 84 passim.
122. See, e.g., Schwartz et al., supra note 4, at 1310 (“[T]erms such as
‘feeling,’ ‘knowing,’ and ‘effort,’ because they are intrinsically mentalistic and
experiential, cannot be described exclusively in terms of material structure.”).
123. See Morse, supra note 79, at 20.
124. Cf. Rose, supra note 49, at 1004 (“Research over many decades has
produced an account of the molecular cascade occurring during memory
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chemical and molecular patterns emerge from the brain when
engaged in a task. As such, it describes forms of brain activity;
but those contours of chemical variation do not explain why
people think pushing someone into the path of a trolley car is
immoral. To say an area of the brain is activated in some
people when faced with this morally fraught dilemma only
exposes the fact that cognitive neuroscience defines its relevant
explanations by the technology it employs.125 And that
technology operates under assumptions and limitations which
circumscribe its explanations.
Likewise, cognitive neuroscientists conveniently ignore
evidence that brains operate in a fashion opposed to the
strictures of brain imaging technology. Brain activation and
localization betray the essential truth that when brains are
engaged in a task, the entire brain is activated.126 The localized
areas of activation which are prominently displayed in pages of
most neuroscience journals are based on the premise that
subtracting activation images between groups reveals distinct
brain regions responsible for the thoughts and behaviors in
question.127 And while it is understood that certain brain
regions are necessary and crucial for defined behaviorssuch
as the motor cortex for movementthose observations in no
way tell us which areas are sufficiently responsible for thinking
about running down to the store for a pint of milk, much less
proscribed acts of predation. To assert that a brain function,
such as visual attention, seems involved with the visual and
parietal lobes of the brain128 fails to elucidate how the mind is
engaged when looking at the works of Cezanne, Rubens, or
formation. However, this summary does not explain the memory, it merely
describes the brain events involved in making it.”).
125. See Logothetis, supra note 73, at 869 (“[L]ike all haemodynamic-based
modalities, [fMRI] measures a surrogate signal whose spatial specificity and
temporal response are subject to both physical and biological constraints.”).
126. See Crawford, supra note 84, at 70
In the case of functional (as opposed to structural) neuroimaging,
what you are seeing when you look at a brain scan is the result of a
subtraction. . . . One . . . problem is that this method eliminates from
the picture the more massive fact, which is that the entire brain is
active in both conditions.
Id.
127. See id.
128. See, e.g., Jody C. Culham et al., Attention Response Functions:
Characterizing Brain Areas Using fMRI Activation During Parametric
Variations of Attentional Load, 32 NEURON 737, 742 (2001).

ERICKSON LF CHECK.WEB (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

3/9/2010 11:40 AM

BLAMING THE BRAIN

53

even a blank sheet of paper. As psychologist William Uttal
notes:
Is it a “stuff” that can be divided, allocated, and focused and that is
available only in limited amounts, and thus can be localized in a
particular part of the brain? Or, to the contrary, is it an attribute or
characteristic of perception . . . inseparable as the diameter or
whiteness of a golf ball is from the physical ball itself? . . . It seems
plausible that many of the psychological components or modules we
seek to locate in a particular region of the brain should likewise be
thought of as properties of a unified mental “object” rather than as
analyzable and isolatable entities.129

What Uttal suggests is what emerging neuroscience
evidence reveals to be so: that the brain is a highly distributed
system with millions of connections at play in any given
moment.130 As such, how people think about matters of love,
jealously, and morality entails understanding how thoughts,
behavior, and the brain are highly interwoven. While brain
imaging experimentsand particularly the interpretations
derived from their resultsoften assert that thinking and
human behavior are merely the end products of determined
brain functions, other evidence suggests the human mind is
much more than this automated view.
One of the key insights provided by neuroscience entails
the dynamic nature of the brain. While it was once assumed
that adult brain structure was static and mostly unaltered by
the environment and behavior itself, it has been firmly
established that this is not the case.131 It is now known that the
brain is constantly in flux, with its structure and function
ceaselessly molded by environmental influences.132 Among
these environmental influences is thought itself, which has the
propensity to alter a wide-range of brain structures and
functions ranging from perception of sensory stimuli to higher-

129. UTTAL LOCALIZING, supra note 80; cf. Crawford, supra note 84, at
6769 (dissenting from Uttal’s description of attention as “stuff” by noting that
most neuroscientists define attention as a function but “this correction does
not vacate the force of Uttal’s criticism, because functions, like properties, are
distributed . . . .”).
130. See Michael S. Gazzaniga, The Law and Neuroscience, 60 NEURON
412, 413 (2008) (“The brain is a highly parallel and distributed system with
literally millions of decisions being made simultaneously.”).
131. Id.
132. Peter Vestergaard-Poulsen et al., Long-Term Meditation Is Associated
with Increased Gray Matter Density in the Brain Stem, 20 NEUROREPORT 170
(2009) (reporting changes in neuronal cell bodies among those who engage in
sustained attention activities).
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ordered behavior.133 For instance, several studies have
demonstrated that psychological therapies which center on
having patients change their thinking about certain
problematic behaviors produces significant changes in cerebral
metabolism, neuronal structure, and regional brain function.134
These studies suggest that thoughts can alter brain structure
and function inasmuch as the reverse may do so. To put it
differently, the mental phenomenon which is only indirectly
measured in the brain imaging paradigm by examining proxies
of neuronal activity may very well exert independent effects
upon the neuronal activity itself. As it was recently put by a
group of prominent neuroscientists:
[T]he assumption that all aspects of mental activity and emotional life
are ultimately explicable solely in terms of micro-local deterministic
brain activity, with no superposed effects of mental effort, produces a
theoretical structure that both fails to meet practical scientific needs,
and also fails to accord with the causal structure of modern
physics.135

Yet discussions of law and neuroscience are nearly devoid
of this vital aspect of brain physiology. The general thesis
employed by those who wish to advance neuroscience within
criminal law suggest that abnormal brain function is indicative
of an agent wholly at the mercy of his aberrant and determined
brain activity.136 These hapless citizens are said to be in no way
responsible for their illicit behavior in the same way that a ball
is not responsible for rolling down a hill.137 The determined
forces operating on the behavior of the ball and the person

133. See Antoine Lutz et al., Long-Term Mediators Self-Induce HighAmplitude Gamma Synchrony During Mental Practice, 46 PROC. NAT’L ACAD.
SCI. 1637172 (2004) (describing how mental training can produce short-term
and long-term neural changes); Vestergaard-Poulsen, et al., supra note 132.
134. See Vincent Paquette et al., “Change the Mind and You Change the
Brain”: Effects of Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy on the Neural Correlates of
Spider Phobia, 18 NEUROIMAGE 401, 40607 (2003) (reporting psychotherapy
modified dysfunctional neuronal structure and function among those with
diagnosed anxiety disorders).
135. Schwartz et al., supra note 4, at 1312.
136. Greene and Cohen make this familiar argument using their example
of Mr. Puppet, a person biologically designed with a predilection towards
violence and vice. They conclude “in a very real sense, we are all puppets. The
combined effects of our genes and environment determine all of our
actions . . . . We are no more free than he is.” Greene & Cohen supra note 3 at,
1780.
137. Id. at 1779.
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plunging a knife into his wife’s chest are one in the same.138
Both are helpless in avoiding their fates disposed by the
material forces at work set in motion outside of their
consciousness.139 Indeed, it is not just those with broken brains
who reside in this stark illusion of personhood, but all of
humanity.140
III. NEUROLAW’S SECRET AMBITION
The law cares much about causation. Whether in the arena
of elaborate regulation or intrinsic rules proscribing harm to
others, scarcely any law exists without the idea that breach of a
law involves action (or omission) by an agent. From this simple
premise flows the notion of culpability. Western legal systems
rest on the assumption that people, acting as agents of their
own behavior (at the very least) are responsible for their
decisions and behaviors.141 The law justifiably holds those who
violate rules as blameworthy and responsible since it is
presumed within most legal codes that people are responsible
for their actions.142
It can be fairly said that an elementary reason why people
obey the law is because the system of rules embodied within it
follows the ordinary intuitions of how behavior should be

138. Id.
139. Id. at 1777 (“[A] deterministic universe starts however it starts and
then ticks along like clockwork from there . . . . [Y]our sense of yourself and
others as having free will is an illusion.”).
140. Id. at 1775 (suggesting that neuroscience will reveal “there is
something fishy about our ordinary conceptions of human action and
responsibility . . . .”).
141. As it was famously put by Hale:
Man is naturally endowed with these two great faculties,
understanding and liberty of will, and therefore is subjected properly
capable of a law properly so called, and consequently obnoxious to
guilt and punishment for the violation of that law, which in respect of
these two great faculties he has a capacity to obey. The consent of the
will is that, which renders human actions either commendable or
culpable, as there is no law there is no transgressions, so regularly
there is no will to commit an offense, there can be no transgression or
just reason to incur the penalty.
1 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 14–15 (1986); see also Smith v. Armontrout, 865
F.2d 1502, 1506 (1988) (“The whole presupposition of the criminal law is that
most people, most of the time, have free will within broad limits.”).
142. See HLA HART & A.M. HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 59 (1959) (“In
the moral judgments of ordinary life, we have occasion to blame people
because they have caused harm to others . . . in all legal systems, liability to be
punished . . . depends on whether actions (or omissions) have caused harm.”).
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regulated in everyday life.143 Those intuitions are firmly rooted
within the social view that people evaluate their environments,
make choices, and impose those choices to the best of their
ability on the world.144 The law has long recognized that those
who are unable to make choices or operate under extreme
duress at the time they make a choice are not legally culpable
agents.145 Thus, incapacitated people cannot commit to
contracts as well as those who commit crimes when under the
immediate threat of death from another are not held
responsible for their behavior.146
In many ways, agency is the crucible of law and humanity.
The power of law is derived from the near universal belief that
people can be persuaded in some fashion to abide by its dictates
or suffer punishment for failure to do so.147 Irrespective of
whether the law is inherently just or overly oppressive, law
operates to influence behavior and the choices of those who live
under its regime.148 While scholars may debate the essence of
justice and mercy, Western legal conceptions of these elements
derive in large measure from the idea that people choose and
intend their behavior most of the time.149 To undo agency risks
143. See Paul H. Robinson, Why Does the Criminal Law Care What the
Layperson Thinks is Just? Coercive Versus Normative Crime Control, 86 VA. L.
REV. 1839, 1861 (2000). Even fervent neurolaw supporters admit as much. See
Greene & Cohen, supra note 3, at 1778 (“The legitimacy of the law itself
depends on its adequately reflecting the moral intuitions and commitments of
society.”).
144. See United States v. Lyons, 739 F.2d 994, 994 (1984) (“An adjudication
of guilt is more than a factual determination that the defendant pulled a
trigger, took a bicycle, or sold heroin. It is a moral judgment that the
individual is blameworthy.”); Alan R. Felthous, The Will: From Metaphysical
Freedom to Normative Functionalism, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 16, 16
(2008) (“It is widely assumed that people have a relatively unhindered
capacity to make choices and to decide what they will do.”); Sousa, supra note
36, at 11 (recounting study results that a majority of respondents thought a
universe of indeterministic choice was most like ours).
145. See Farah, supra note 69, at 38.
146. Id.
147. PAUL M. SNIDERMAN ET AL., REASONING AND CHOICE: EXPLORATIONS
IN POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 207 (1991).
148. Id.
149. The idea that an act cannot entail blame without a guilty mind is
often said to be the cornerstone of modern criminal law. See Duncan v. State,
26 Tenn. (7 Hum.) 148, 150 (“It is a sacred principle of criminal jurisprudence
that the intention to commit the crime is of the essence of the crime . . . .”); see
generally Albert Levitt, The Origins of the Doctrine of Mens Rea, 17 U. ILL. L.
REV. 117 passim (1922) (describing the influence of ecclesiastical law on
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undoing the very heart of how law operates and the connection
between law and the people it governs.
But neurolaw’s promise to reveal why people think and
behave as they do is inescapably built on the idea that people
are not agents as the law traditionally views them. Instead,
they are guided almost entirely by determined and unconscious
chemical cascades which exert irresistible control over an
agent’s thinking and behavior. What is needed is not blame and
punishment but therapeutic interventions formulated by
science which can control and mitigate future harm. A
neurolaw informed criminal justice policy sees criminal
behavior as the result of abnormal brain processes, not the
exercise of willful choice by free agents. What matters is not
whether those agents knew that their behavior was wrong, but
whether they can control it in the future. And understanding
whether an agent has the ability to do so rests entirely under
the expertise of science, not judges or juries. Neurolaw seeks
not just to inform the law, but also to impose its supremacy in
crafting policy. It begins this endeavor by undoing the
distinction between the criminal and civil code.
A. MAKING THE CRIMINAL, CIVIL
Criminal law proscribes conduct. Yet most criminal
statutes begin their proscriptions not with behavior but with
mental states.150 Modern criminal law goes to great lengths to
differentiate between those who intend their illicit conduct
from those who fail to exercise prudence even if the conduct
produces the same result. The difference between murder and
manslaughter generally falls not on the end result of the
agent’s behavior but her mental state at the time of the offense.
Thus, criminal law follows ordinary intuition which hold that
death caused by the intentional or malicious conduct of a
defendant should be treated very differently than when it is
caused by reckless or careless behavior. It is from this common
intuition that mercy and mitigation flow.151 Even when agents

modern Western legal codes which emphasized the mental state in
determining blameworthiness).
150. Cf. JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 70 (2d ed.
1960) (“The principle of mens rea is the ultimate evaluation of criminal
conduct and, because of that, it is deeply involved in theories of punishment.”).
151. See O. Carter Snead, Neuroimaging and the “Complexity” of Capital
Punishment, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1265, 130912(2007) (describing the nexus
between retribution, mitigation, and intuition).
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engage in intentional conduct which violates the law, their
related blameworthiness is weighed against facts which might
suggest reduced culpability.152 The affirmative defenses of
insanity, extreme emotional disturbance, or duress exist
because the law is grounded in the notion that for most
proscriptions, mental states matter in determining
culpability.153
But it was not always this way. The view that a
defendant’s mental state mattered in determining culpability is
an outgrowth of important developments in enlightened
society. Before the Twelfth Century, strict liability was the
regular course for criminal law.154 The view that extenuating
circumstances should matter in determining not only a
defendant’s culpability but his punishment as well was entirely
foreign. People were held strictly accountable and punished for
their behavior alone.155 Whether someone intended to commit a
crime or caused the prohibited conduct by recklessness or
negligence was irrelevant to determinations of culpability and
dispensing of punishments.156 The pre-twelfth criminal justice
system operated efficiently and brutally: Trials were quick and
dispensation of punishment quicker.157
Succeeding years brought nuance to the criminal law.158
Many critics of the current criminal code quite rightly lament
its breadth and depth.159 Indeed, many behaviors are regulated
and outlawed. And many of those are outlawed repeatedly
through numerous layers of jurisdictions. But what is often
neglected in this discussion is that the birth of this growth was
partly due to the emergence of the doctrine of mens rea. That
is, criminal law began its enlargement under the elementary
premise that it mattered more what an agent intended than the
152. See Farah, supra note 69, at 38.
153. Id.
154. See Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 977 (1932)
(“[F]or whatever the law in action may have been, [fragments of early English
law] show that at least in the recorded law prior to the twelfth century, a
criminal intent was not recognized as an indispensable requisite for
criminality.”).
155. Id. at 97778 n.9.
156. Id.
157. See, e.g, id. at 976 (discussing trial by battle).
158. See id. at 100417.
159. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100
MICH. L. REV. 505, 507–08, 519–23 (2001).
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actual harm caused by his conduct.160 Whether an agent should
be punished severely or excused for causing the death of
another is determined not by the behavior which resulted in
the criminal conduct but by what he (or a reasonable person in
the same situation) knew and intended.161 And while many
scholars have questioned the nature of the reasonable person
standard, those critiques largely agree that modern law gives
credence to an agent’s mental states.162 Thus, justified
homicide results in no punishment or blame because the law
freely accepts the idea that it is permissible to kill another
when under threat of immediate death from an aggressor.
And to be free of blame is what results in freedom from
punishment. The law holds the agent who justifiably kills
outside the purview of punishment because to do otherwise
would offend ordinary intuitions of blameworthiness.163
Likewise, the law views predatory behavior as especially
egregious because ordinary intuitions of justice suggest that
agents who premeditate and carry out calculated crimes
against innocent victims represent the pinnacle of blameworthy
conduct which the law finds so offensive.164 It is offensive and
punished severely not because the resulting harm is the
greatest in any consequential sense, but simply because it so
deeply trespasses against the shared intuitions of proper
conduct venerated by most people. And those intuitions are
shared not just provincially, but across cultures and
generations.165 Despite all of our individual differences, most
people agree that intentional unlawful conduct is worse than
negligent behavior irrespective of the resulting harm.166
These shared intuitions of justice can reveal much about
the way people conceptualize behavior, blame, and punishment.
A common critique suggests that in thinking about crime,
people make judgments based on emotion.167 Indeed, several
160. See Sayre, supra note 154, at 98894.
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., MAYO MORAN, RETHINKING THE REASONABLE PERSON 5–17
(2003).
163. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 2, at 10.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. For a review of empirical studies examining intuitions of justice across
demographics see Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordance and
Conflict in Intuitions of Justice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1829 (2007).
167. Usually the emotion indentified in driving judgments about crime is
fear. See DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL
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cognitive neuroscience studies seem to suggest this is true.168
Yet the subtle premise among such critiques is that this is
inherently a bad thing and the legal process should do what it
can to minimize it.169 And perhaps in some ways it should. But
not much attention is paid to how such practices might destroy
the common bond between the public and the criminal code
which proscribes their conduct. If shared intuitions of justice
are indeed mutual across all cultures then they serve as a
touchstone of something that is uniquely emblematic of our
humanity. At the least, these intuitions tell us what it means to
hold someone blameworthy and not just responsible.
Indeed, what makes the criminal law different from the
civil code is the unique way it blames and punishes. When a
tortfeasor is held liable, we blame her for her wrongdoing. We
may even feel strong condemnation for her actions. But we do
not make determinations about her character or value to
society in the same way those judgments are exercised in
criminal cases. Moral blameworthiness is the exclusive domain

ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 10 (2001) (discussing the invocation of fear
in crime control policy during the 1970s). But see Emily Gray et al.,
Reassessing the Fear of Crime, 5 EUR. J. CRIMINOLOGY 363, 37377 (2008)
(questioning the scope of that fear on methodological grounds). Vengeance is
also commonly identified as being expressed in the criminal law. See Robert C.
Solomon, Justice v. Vengeance: On Law and the Satisfaction of Emotion, in
THE PASSIONS OF LAW 123 passim (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999). For an
overview of psychological research into emotions, see Neal Feigenson &
Jaihyun Park, Emotions and Attributions of Legal Responsibility and Blame:
A Research Review, 30 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 143 (2006).
168. See Joshua W. Buckholtz et al. The Neural Correlates of Third-Party
Punishment 60 NEURON 930, 935 (2008); Ming Hsu et al., The Right and the
Good: Distributive Justice and Neural Encoding of Equity and Efficiency, 320
SCI. 1092, 1095 (2008).
169. These arguments are often made based on examination of victim
impact statements and crime scene photographs during trial. See¸ e.g., Jessica
M. Salerno & Bette L. Bottoms, Emotional Evidence and Jurors’ Judgments:
The Promise of Neuroscience for Informing Psychology and Law, 27 BEHAV.
SCI. & L. 274, 27582 (2009) (reviewing studies of “emotional evidence” and
arguing for a greater understanding of the role that emotion plays in jury
decision-making). But see Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of Victim Impact
Statements, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM L. 611 (2009) (discussing empirical evidence
which suggests no significant association between victim impact statements
and sentencing outcomes); Theodore Eisenberg et al., Victim Characteristics
and Victim Impact Evidence in South Carolina Capital Cases, 88 CORNELL L.
REV. 308, 30910, 341 (2003) (finding no significant association between
victim impact statements and sentencing outcomes in over 200 cases).
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of the criminal law.170 It judges and condemns people for
behavior which so deeply intrudes upon common intuitions of
what people view as fundamentally necessary and right in an
ordered society. It is hardly surprising, then, that criminal law
traditionally reserves its most severe punishment for crimes
which offend this intuitional (and institutional) social order:
murder, rape, assault, and theft. It also is unsurprising that
society seems rather undaunted about whether these
punishments are consequentially effective at deterring crime.
Under this lens, criminal law is not about consequential gains,
but it is entirely rationale in a folk psychological sense.
But those who view behavior from a cognitive neuroscience
perspective are hardly impressed with these shared intuitions
gleaned from generations. Instead, blame represents a vestige
of our primordial pastthe all too frequent override of our
primitive and emotional brain over our recently acquired
cortex.171 They see our criminal justice system as foolishly wed
to intuitions which are prone to biases and imprudently
concerned with an agent’s intent.172 Indeed, the very notion
that criminal behavior should be viewed as a criminal matter
whatsoever makes little sense. Rather, crime is a sign of
underlying brain pathology.173 Those who steal have impulsive
brains;174 those who inflict pain and physical misery unto
others are said to lack an empathic brain.175 Crime itself is a
sign of epidemic mental disorder throughout the land.
Punishment is irrational from this perspective. If agents
are largely unable to control their conduct because of the
determined nature of their brains, then it makes little sense to
punish people for their conduct. Since punishment begins with
social condemnation, it wrongly assumes that the convicted

170. See Paul H. Robinson, The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the Utility
of Desert, 76 B. U. L. REV. 201, 202 (1996) (“Central to lay person’s view is that
criminal sanctions signal moral condemnation, while civil penalties do not.”).
171. See Johannes Haushofer & Ernst Fehr, You Shouldn’t Have: Your
Brain on Others Crimes, 60 NEURON 738,739 (2008).
172. See Greene & Cohen, supra note 3, at 1776.
173. See Adrian Raine, From Genes to Brain to Antisocial Behavior, 17
CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 323, 323 (2008) (“The key concept
highlighted in this review is that specific genes result in structural and
functional brain alterations that, in turn, predispose to antisocial behavior.”).
174. See generally id. at 324 (explaining that those who commit violent
crime have impulsive brains).
175. See Alison Abbott, Abnormal Neuroscience: Scanning Psychopaths,
450 NATURE 942, 942 (2007).
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agent exercised control over his conduct. Instead of
punishment, cognitive neuroscience desires to deploy a panoply
of therapeutic interventions aimed at ameliorating future
harm.176 Thus, instead of looking back at an agent’s wrongful
conduct as the meter of his deserved punishment, cognitive
neuroscience looks exclusively forward at an agent’s risk of
future dangerousness.177 And while this criminal justice policy
holds some luster because it measures deprivations of liberty
entirely from a consequential perspective, it also accomplishes
two secret ambitions of the cognitive neuroscience movement.
First, it severs the measurement of punishment from ordinary
intuitions of justice and fairness Second, it conveys
construction of crime policy from a legal framework to one
engineered by science.
The amputation of punishment from the public’s intuitions
is the grand hope which rides near the crest of neurolaw’s
ambition. Few articles which discuss neuroscience and
punishment fail to mention what is perceived as the malignant
pathology within crime policy these days: the rise of
retribution.178 And the blame for this rebirth of desert falls
squarely on the influence that common intuitions of justice play
in crafting crime policy.179 Critics contend that our modern
criminal justice system is overwrought with placating the
public’s demand for desert.180 Instead, they argue, we should
entrust a forward-focused system, guided by experts who will
dispassionately gauge confinement based on an offender’s
propensities. After all, propensities can be ameliorated and
managed, but what has happened in the past cannot be
undone.
While the critics may be right, they are short-sighted:
mitigation and mercy are direct descendants of desert.181 Mercy
176. Although few have argued directly for this result, it is a presumed
goal given the foreseen influence of neuroscience with the criminal justice
system and the ubiquity of the technology. Cf. Greene & Cohen, supra note 3,
at 1781 (“At some further point this sort of brainware may be very widespread,
with a high-resolution brain scanner in every classroom. People may grow up
completely used to the idea that every decision is a thoroughly mechanical
process. . . .”).
177. Id. at 1776.
178. Id. at 177678.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See Snead, supra note 151, at 131922.
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does not flow from an agent’s future propensities, but from her
past circumstances which suggest she is less blameworthy. We
feel sorry for the defendant who was repeatedly abused as a
child, even if that abuse suggests a heightened risk for future
harm to the public.182 If ordinary intuitions are indeed based on
emotions, those emotions forgive as well as condemn. It may be
the case that modern society does not enough of the former and
too much of the latter, but employing more mercy may very
well entail opening the emotional spigot of intuitions instead of
welding them shut entirely.183
And while focusing on an offender’s future propensities
may appear more sensible than beckoning blame, it is dubious
whether this will result in a more humane criminal justice
system. Future propensities are notoriously difficult to
externally manage. The work in criminal psychology has
plainly demonstrated that two factors are largely responsible
for recidivism across a diverse population of offenders. The first
is alcohol and drug abuse; the second are dispositional traits
that run to the core of an agent’s personality.184 Both are
exceptionally recalcitrant to change and easily evasive of
external monitoring even in therapeutic settings. But that has
not prevented a host of legal prescriptions based on the
therapeutic lens from being implemented for offenders deemed
mentally unsound. And those legal prescriptions are hardly
favorable for criminal defendants.
For years, most sex offenders were punished and sentenced
to prison. In 1996, the Supreme Court decided the case Kansas
v. Henricks,185 which upheld a statute authorizing the civil
commitment of sex offenders after they had served their prison
sentences if they suffered from a mental abnormality. The
statute merely required that a person subject to the statute
have a condition which affected his “emotional or volitional
182. See Cathy Spatz Widom, Child Abuse, Neglect, and Violent Criminal
Behavior¸ 27 CRIMINOLOGY 251, 26063 (1989) (reporting a significant
association between child abuse and arrests for violence during adulthood
among a large sample of children).
183. The rise of the administrative state which is very isolated from
common intuitions probably only hastens that trend. See Rachel E. Barkow,
The Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of Mercy, 121 HARV. L.
REV. 1332, 136263 (2008).
184. See D.A. ANDREWS & JAMES BONTA, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL
CONDUCT (4th Ed. 2006) for a methodical overview of the identified risk
factors for criminal recidivism.
185. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360, 371 (1997).
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capacity”186 in a manner which predisposed him to commit
sexually violent conduct. Because the aim of the statute was
therapeutic and not punitive, Constitutional protections
afforded to defendants were unavailable to Henricks. The
prolonged incapacitation of people like Henricks is made
possible by the very fact that they are within the civil mental
health system and not under the regime of criminal
punishment with its enumerated Constitutional protections.
It may be difficult to feel much sympathy for people like
Henricks, but his indefinite confinement is only possible
because he is deemed to have a propensity for unlawful conduct
caused by an amorphous mental abnormality that is considered
amenable to therapeutic treatment. His predilection for
pedophilia is a mental abnormality not just because the aim of
his pursuits is illicit, but because he is said to lack control over
his behavior. This dual determination that the content of his
desires and inability to control them are a mental abnormality
may have some folk psychological grounding. But the architect
of the mentally disordered mindset prevalent in our culture is
science itself. After all, it is the official diagnostic manual of
psychiatry which holds seventeen different mental disorders
based on sexual conduct.187
Inasmuch as cognitive neuroscience promises to reveal how
people think, its message has also been that behavior is
routinely outside of the control of the agent.188 The reason why
implicit biases matter is not that people may have them, but
that they act on them.189 What neurolaw openly admits is what
implicitly grants it power: that it can reveal how the mind
operates and those revelations mean that science can craft

186. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994).
187. DSM-IV REVISION, supra note 59, at 535–82.
188. See generally WEGNER, supra note 43, at 1–28 (arguing that the
experience of consciously willing an action is not a direction indication that the
conscious thought has caused the action—that it is actually a complex
illusion).
189. The concept of implicit biases has received much scholarly attention,
due in large part, to results of numerous studies utilizing the Implicit
Association Test. For an overview, see Anthony G. Greenwaldt & Linda
Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945,
951 (2006). But see Hart Blanton et al., Strong Claims and Weak Evidence:
Reassessing the Predictive Validity of the IAT, 94 J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOL. 567,
580–81(2009) (heavily criticizing the psychometric properties of the Implicit
Association Test).

ERICKSON LF CHECK.WEB (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

BLAMING THE BRAIN

3/9/2010 11:40 AM

65

policy better than the law.190 That is so because the mind
executes behavior and it is conduct that the law regulates. In a
determined world where minds occupy harmful intentions
unknown even to those who possess them, the promise of
science is its ability to discern with reasonable definitiveness
how and when people will act on those intentions. This
ineluctably places science in a better position in formulating
crime policy when the only legitimate distributive principles of
punishment are consequential ones.
The coming transformation of our criminal justice system
promised by the cognitive neuroscientists thus rests on a
deceptively simple tripartite set of premises which has a
profound implication. Quite audaciously, they assert that the
human mind is a determined entity whose processes can be
entirely revealed by the field of neuroscience; the determined
nature of the mind means that concepts such as intention are
illusory; and deserved punishment is illogical. The implications
of these positions, however, bluntly challenge the nature and
justification for a criminal justice system itself. If what
differentiates the criminal justice system from civil regulation
is its ability to punish for the sake of moral condemnation, then
under the tripartite model of cognitive neuroscience the
criminal justice system should dissolve as “the idea of
distinguishing the truly, deeply guilty from those who are
merely victims of neuronal circumstances” will indeed be
pointless.191 After all, what could be considered criminal
without a guilty mind?192
B. RISE OF THE CONTROL TESTS
In most cases, it is axiomatic that to blame an agent of
criminal conduct is to accuse her of possessing a guilty mind at
the time of the offense. This link between blame and mind is a
foundational bridge between law and the common intuitions of
the people it governs. That is, the law holds to a strong account
of human agency harmonious with how most people believe the

190. See Greene & Cohen, supra note 3, at 1781 (describing how
neuroscience will play a central role in crime policy by making “detailed
predictions about how the mechanical processes [of the mind] work”).
191. See id.
192. See Levitt, supra note 149, at 117 (“Nearly all the courts say that
there can be no criminal act unless there has been a criminal intent; that a
guilty mind must be present or no crime is committed.”).
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mind operates.193 For the law, brains do not commit to
contracts, become married, or commit crimespeople do.194
Thus, people are accountable for their behaviors and the law
can legitimately punish people for engaging in behaviors which
the law dictates run afoul of the established code. That code is
in many respects a social contract between the people and its
government. 195 It is also a contract which provides assurances
to individual citizens that they are expected to act lawfully
irrespective of their personal propensities or liabilities towards
unlawfulness. In turn, fellow citizens can expect the same from
others. It is in this fashion that people can reasonably assume
others will refrain from untoward acts of harm despite their
impulse or robust desire to do otherwise. In sum, choices
matter for personal responsibility under the law and in our
society as well.196
But the law has also long recognized that under certain
circumstances, people are not responsible for their behavior.
Substantive criminal law in most jurisdictions provides that a
person is not guilty of a crime if he did not know or appreciate
the wrongfulness of his actions due to a mental illness or
defect. Almost all reasonable scientists these days hold to the
193. As Chief Justice Biggs put it:
The concept of mens rea, guilty mind, is based on the assumption that
a person has a capacity to control his behavior and to choose between
alternative courses of conduct. This assumption, though not
unquestioned by theologians, philosophers and scientists, is necessary
to the maintenance and administration of social controls. It is only
through this assumption that society has found it possible to impose
duties and create liabilities designed to safeguard persons and
property.
United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 773 (3d Cir. 1961); see also Charles C.
Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1936) (“[T]he law has been
guided by a robust common sense which assumes the freedom of the will as a
working hypothesis in the solution of its problems.”); Speranza, supra note 34,
at 125 (“Law, on the other hand, stands pre-eminently for the freedom of the
will.”).
194. See Stephen J. Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal
Responsibility: A Diagnostic Note, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 397, 397 (2006).
195. Cf. Gregg Cartage & Storage Co. v. United States, 316 U.S. 74, 7980
(1942) (“[T]he practical business of government and administration of the law
is obliged to proceed on more or less rough and ready judgments based on the
assumption that mature and rational persons are in control of their own
conduct.”).
196. See 1 GEORGE P. FLETCHER, THE GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW 266
(2007) (“The capacity for executing choices provides the foundations for
responsibility in criminal law.”).
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biological hypothesis of mental illness.197 Those illnesses most
associated with insanity claimspsychotic illnessesare
presumed to originate in the brain and are principally involved
with much of the behavior concerning claims of reduced
culpability. Indeed, some of the most compelling evidence from
neuroscience that bears on brains and behavior comes from
studies demonstrating severe and enduring global deficits in
the brains of people afflicted with psychotic illnesses.198 As
commonly understood, the person is excused because of his
impaired brain. That is, his afflicted brain is believed to
obscure his true mind. But cognitive neuroscientists and their
supporters claim that this distinction between brains, minds,
and people is superfluous: all that matters is the brain.199 If
that is true, then excusing agents because of their brains seems
absurd. Brains cannot excuse the mind because they are one
and the same.
But what cognitive neuroscience supporters are really
suggesting is not that excuse is illogical, but that that the legal
emphasis on a defendant’s cognitive state is misplaced. In their
view, an agent’s self-awareness is deceptive because they are
entertained by a stout illusion of free will. Ascertaining
whether an agent possessed a guilty mind at some point in the
past is not only difficult but pointless. Determinations of
whether an agent knew his behavior was wrong conflate
knowledge with intention; to say an agent understood that his
behavior was unlawful and acted anyway wrongly implies that
he could have intended otherwise.
Since cognitive neuroscience views intentions as illusory,

197. See Carl I. Cohen, The Biomedicalization of Psychiatry: A Critical
Overview, 29 COMTY. MENTAL HEALTH J. 509, 50910 (1993) (noting that
biological psychiatry is now the dominant version of psychiatry); see also,
Samuel H. Barondes, The Biological Approach to Psychiatry: History and
Prospects, 10 J. NEUROSCIENCE 1707, 170809 (1990) (discussing the rise of
biological psychiatry).
198. See Christos Pantelis et al., Structural Brain Imaging Evidence for
Multiple Pathological Processes at Different Stages of Brain Development in
Schizophrenia, 31 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 672 passim (2005) (reviewing the
wealth of studies reporting numerous and significant abnormalities in brains
of those afflicted with schizophrenia including progressive changes that occur
during the earliest stages of the disease, often before the initiation of
pharmacotherapy); see also Paul J. Harris & David A. Lewis, Neuropathology
of Schizophrenia, in SCHIZOPHRENIA 310, 31025 (Steven R. Hirsch & Daniel
Weinberger eds., 2003) for a general discussion on the various brain
abnormalities associated with schizophrenia.
199. See Greene & Cohen, supra note 3, at 1779.
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what matters are the biological and genetic propensities of the
agent which are exercised from his brain.200 And while these
properties are impinged by the environmental forces
encountered by the agent during everyday life, the neurolaw
view holds the agent as hapless in avoiding any of the
untoward effects of those interactions. These behavioral
propensities lodged deep within the brain are thought to result
directly in conduct irrespective of an agent’s desires or wishes
otherwise. Whatever self-awareness or willful movement
actually entails, it’s domain over the biological circuitry of
behavior is trivial.
What this entails for criminal responsibility at the margins
is a move towards control tests in excuse and diminished
capacity defenses. That is, neurolaw asserts that what matters
in determining an agent’s culpability is her volition and not her
intentions or knowledge. By claiming science has illuminated
that people operate in a manner quite divergent from their folk
psychological beliefs, neurolaw hopes to bring biology to the
foreground in forming social and legal norms. And because the
disparity between common intuitions and cognitive
neuroscience are their greatest in the realm of responsibility,
neurolaw has focused its attention at influencing criminal law
doctrine where accounts of responsibility are most salient.
Supporters claim three closely related benefits from this
neuro-jurisprudence model of criminal law. First, it removes
blame from determinations of guilt and calculations of
punishment. Because blame is viewed as a farrago of
expressive judgments unwisely tethered to human passions, its
impact on criminal adjudications can be avoided.201 Second,
neuroscience will advance a preventive model of criminal
justice aimed squarely at avoiding future harms.202 And third,
neuroscience, aided by other fields of psychological science, can
uncouple culpability determinations from the arm of criminal
sanctions.203

200. Id. at 1781. (“[Y]our brain serves as a bottleneck for all the forces
spread throughout the universe of your past that affect who you are and what
you do.”).
201. See id. at 1782.
202. Id. at 1783.
203. See Slobogin, supra note 9, at 165 (stating that “[t]he punishment
model of the criminal law is currently threatened by the newly popular
prevention model of intervention, one that is based on predictions of risk

ERICKSON LF CHECK.WEB (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

BLAMING THE BRAIN

3/9/2010 11:40 AM

69

All of these claimed benefits rest on the larger premise
proffered by cognitive neuroscience which holds that agent’s
self-awareness greatly inflates her true ability to control her
conduct. Behavior generates from discharges of neuronal
output which are largely (if not entirely) beyond the influence
of consciousness. As a consequence, excuse should rest solely
with determinations of volition.
Legal formulations of excuse vary over jurisdictions and
have unquestionably been influenced by cultural perceptions of
the mind and mental illness.204 Yet quintessentially the
doctrine holds that a person is not responsible for a criminal
conduct if during the commission of the crime, due to a mental
illness or defect, he lacks substantial capacity to either
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct
to the requirements of the law.205 This standard test holds that
excuse is warranted when a defendant lacks the awareness to
know right from wrong or is unable to control himself.206 And
while the time and venue have favored one part of this test over
the other, the cognitive prong has resolutely remained intact
over the years.
But cognitive neuroscience promises fundamental change
to the excuse doctrine. While it confidently articulates an
ability to discern how people think, it also suggests that
individual awareness plays a minimal role in the course of day
to day conduct. Instead, behavior is mostly an autonomous
process whereby people mechanically respond to stimuli
presented to them.207 Concepts deeply engrained in criminal
law, such as intent, are considered remnants of the folk
psychological belief required by society that obeying the law
necessitates thinking and choosing by an agent. That this view
might suggest a radical overhaul of criminal liability in its
entirety has not gone without notice among its
proponentsindeed much of the neurolaw literature gleefully
anticipates it. But institutional change tends to come
incrementally. The emerging dominance of control tests in
culpability assessments is the first brick removed from the
uncabined by culpability assessments.”).
204. See MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY
DEFENSE (1993).
205. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1968).
206. Id.
207. See ALBERT BANDURA, SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF THOUGHT AND
ACTION: A SOCIAL COGNITIVE THEORY 12 (1986).
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pillar of mens rea in criminal law.
And while institutional change is a necessary force within
law, science stands apart from political and other authorities
who impinge legal doctrine because it is seen as empirical and
objective. Arguments favoring the demise of desert in favor of
consequential sanctions can be appealing for a variety of
reasons. But those which rely heavily on neuroscience entail
prediction of future behavior as the linchpin of their reforms.
Instead of utilizing common intuitions of guilt as the meter for
deserved punishment, those who propose a neuro-person model
of culpability place their faith in the ability of the behavioral
sciences to accurately predict future behavior. Control tests
satisfy this reform because they imply a persistent impairment
of behavioral capacity.
While prediction of behavior has endured its share of heavy
criticism over the years, the rise of a new method is enjoying
wide acceptance from mental health professionals and the
courts. Actuarial risk assessment uses crude analysis of
historical data to predict future behaviorranging from sexual
recidivism to violence.208 These methods are already broadly
employed by experts in all stages of civil and criminal
adjudications where risk of unlawful or undesirable conduct is
of concern.209 Due in large measure to the legal conversion of
acts of rape and pedophilia from crimes to mental
abnormalities,210 cases turning on expert assessment of future
dangerousness are legion.211 Consideration of future
dangerousness by way of these behavioral assessments
dominates sentencing in capital cases as well.212 Sentencing
alternatives, including the heralded drug and mental health

208. See John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting
Harm Among Prisoners, Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 40809
(2006).
209. Id. at 408-09 nn.71-72.
210. The behaviors associated with these crimes are now deemed mental
abnormalities as well as criminal conduct under the law. See Erickson, supra
note 56, at 7273.
211. See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION 39108 (2007);
Monahan, supra note 208, at 396404; see also David DeMatteo & John F.
Edens, The Role and Relevance of the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised in Court:
A Case Law Survey of U.S. Courts (1991-2004), 12 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L.
214, 214 (2006) (noting the prevalence of admitting an instrument for
measuring psychopathy in civil and criminal cases).
212. See Snead supra, note 151, at 132224 (2007).
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courts, are premised on the idea that interventional behavioral
treatments will reduce future illegal behavior in predictable
waysand that those who may benefit from these
interventions can be determined and selected from the general
pool of offenders.213 The marriage between behavioral
prediction and interventional therapeutics is strong and
growing stronger by the day.
What is often neglected in discussions about this new
science of prediction, however, is how closely the science
mirrors common intuitions. The empirical literature within the
behavioral sciences strongly suggests that the largest risk
factors for future unlawful behavior are ones found in lay
judgments about punishment and risk. Prior bad acts, chronic
drug abuse, and an offender’s penchant for violating social
norms weigh heavily in favor of recidivism in both camps. And
while science can claim that its approach is methodically and
analytically superior, it has yet to demonstrate how its
approach generalizes to superior understandings about
population trends. That is, science is on par with lay intuitions
about individual recidivism factors, but it remains a mystery
why crime rates rise and fall over time despite all of the
sophisticated empirical analyses employed over the yearsjust
as most lay intuitions seem dumbfounded to explain these
trends.
The prediction model, however, openly favors experts. It
desires distributive punishment as an enterprise that has a
strong fidelity to incapacitation and the prevention of future
harms. And within this model, someone must judge and
determine who is dangerous and should be detained and who is
harmless and should go free. To accomplish this task, the
prediction model must invariably engage in the precarious side
of what lay intuitions do in ascertaining risk: grouping people
by their shared traits. Psychological science has long
demonstrated that people have the tendency to make
judgments about othersparticularly when judging riskby
using heuristic cues about individuals that imply membership
to a larger group.214 Whether that means the individual is lefthanded and the person judging him implicitly views all lefthanded people as a passive bores entertained by math and
213. See Greg Berman & John Feinblatt, Problem-Solving Courts: A Brief
Primer, 23 LAW & POL’Y 125, 131135 (2001).
214. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1124 (1974).
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crossword puzzles or the individual retains membership to a
certain ethnicity and the person views that ethnicity with
suspicion or contempt, unconscious cues seem to matter in how
people make day to day judgments about risk.
To make predictions about a person’s risk of future
behavior means placing that person within a group with known
risk factors. No one seriously entertains the idea that a
prediction model based on neuroscience would engage in overt
racism by pooling race as a risk factor. The difference between
lay intuitions which group people based on heuristics and a
prediction model assembled by experts would be that the latter
would not be influenced by overt prejudices. But inescapably,
that model would hold manifestly genetic factors as important
and thus group offenders together because of that fact. Indeed,
this is already being done. One of the most prevalent sex
offender recidivism assessment tools employed by experts
weights gender as a significant risk factor215as it should.
The harm is not that future prevention models would
routinely employ genetic factors such as gender in
determinations of future dangerousness. They would be foolish
not to do so. But wedding cognitive neuroscience and the
prevention model risks classifying brains based on what is not
manifestly evident to most people. To say that an offender
poses a risk of future harm because of deficient
neurotransmitter production216 or slight delays in pressing keys
when viewing illicit images217 removes these determinations
from any grounding in common intuitions. That those who
support the prediction model suggest that people outside of the
traditional purview of the criminal justice system might also be
215. Known as the Static-99, this actuarial scale uses gender as one of the
ten items it evaluates. See Static-99 Clearinghouse, http://www.static99.org/
(last visited Nov. 6, 2009).
216. A proposed link between deficit production of a neurotransmitter
known as serotonin and violence was established less than a decade ago. See
Avshalom Caspi et al., Role of Genotype in the Cycle of Violence in Maltreated
Children, 297 SCI. 851, 853 (2002). But see Niel Risch et al., Interaction
Between the Serotonin Transporter Gene (5-HTTLPR), Stressful Life Events,
and Risk of Depression: A Meta-Analysis, 301 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2462, 2468
(showing no link between the proposed serotonin gene and psychological
disorder).
217. See Gillian Smith & Lane Fischer, Assessment of Juvenile Sexual
Offenders: Reliability and Validity of the Abel Assessment, 11 SEXUAL ABUSE
207 passim (1999) for a review of this controversial, yet widely used
psychological test.
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within the scope of such a model suggests the reach would be
massive. Rather than reverse the breadth and depth of the
current criminal justice system, the prediction model seems all
too likely to expand it greatly.
C. ABOLITION OF AGENCY
Most people believe that they have an ability to impose
their desires and intentions in the world. They also believe that
others, absent severe mental or neurological disease, do the
same. In common sense terms, as well, some people have more
difficulty controlling their conduct than others.218 Some can
indulge in alcohol to moderation while others cannot, in part,
because of their biology. To be born means to be born with
biological attributes and liabilities.
The law embodies this view of humanity because it is
fundamentally a human enterprise. The law of legislatures and
courts is not the law of physics or chemistry. It does not exist
independent of the judgments of those who are subject to its
rules. Rather, it exists because those who are subject to its
rules value certain beliefs and ideals which the law
incorporates into its code. The force of law is bolstered or
subdued by the bind of humanity which is under its rule.
Justice means different things to different people, but few
would hold that letting the guilty go free or punishing the
innocent are just outcomes. These shared beliefs about justice
reveal important aspects of the law which are necessary for
people to view it as legitimate and fair. Nowhere are these
shared beliefs stronger than in conduct deemed criminalthey
go to the core of what it means for law to do justice.219
These shared intuitions, then, are vital to the criminal
law’s operation. Irrespective of whether they are imprudently
influenced by emotions or prone to manipulation by cunning
218. See Stephen J. Morse, Against Control Tests for Criminal
Responsibility, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 1 (Paul H. Robinson et al.
eds., 2009).
219. See Paul H. Robinson et al., The Origins of Shared Intuitions of
Justice, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1633, 163438 (2007) (demonstrating a consensus on
the core intuitions of justice even across demographics and cultures). This core
consensus occurs during early development. See Jonathan Haidt et al., Affect,
Culture, and Morality, or Is It Wrong to Eat Your Dog?, 65 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 613, 617, 62122 (1993) (observing that children ten to twelve
years old across the cultures investigated think that pushing another child off
a swing should be punished and that this behavior would be wrong in other
countries as well).
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persuasion,220 they lie at the heart of what it means to condemn
others and justify punishment. We punish and condemn
because we blame people for behaving wrongly. And that blame
is not just a statement that someone has transgressed against
the law, but is a proclamation that they have violated deeply
held social norms important to most people.221
The mode of neurolaw is one divorced from this
understanding. Its explanations are geared toward undoing
conventional models of crime and punishment in favor of one
built on mechanistic accounts of behavior. Aided by technology
that few understand, neurolaw’s draw is its promise to unravel
the mysteries of the mind and demonstrate that thinking and
behavior are predictable given its mechanical and determined
naturethat the mind is not that great of a mystery after all.
So, too, does the prediction model seek in unraveling the
influence of intuitions from judgments of guilt and punishment.
As a forward-focused enterprise, prediction is liberated from
determinations of blameworthiness. Instead, its goal is cabined
within the expertise of science in judging future harm based on
the view that incapacitation as the central pillar of crime policy
distributes justice more fairly and rationally.
Both neurolaw’s explanation of behavior and the prediction
model’s goal of moving sentencing determinations into the
realm of prevention diminish the concept of the guilty mind in
criminal law. Neurolaw claims awareness and intention are
minefields of illusions; prediction models view the past
intentions of an agent as irrelevant. Uncoupling guilt from
criminal sanctions is considered both principled and prudential:
the guilty mind requirement is extraneous and pointless; it also
stands in the way of a criminal justice system based on
prevention of future harm. And prevention of future harm
necessarily means employing legal sanctions before the
occurrence of unlawful conductbefore the criminal act arises.
After all, that is what preventive detention is all about.
The breadth and depth of that system of criminal justice
will be massive. The real danger will not be that neurolaw will
220. The argument against intuitional judgments usually falls on the
notion that they are emotionally laden and irrational. See JESSE J. PRINZ, THE
EMOTIONAL CONSTRUCTION OF MORALS (2007).
221. Cf. Jeffery J. Rachlinski, The Limits of Social Norms, 74 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1537, 153942 (2000) (discussing the difficulties in using social norms for
public policy).
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completely undo criminal law but that it will retain the vast
power of criminal law to sanction behavior while removing
personal responsibility from the legal presumption that
unlawful conduct deserves to be punished. Unlawful behavior
will be seen as indicative of a sick mind with its agent
hopelessly along for the ride. Rational crime policy will entail
therapeutic interventions instead of punishment. Those
interventions will have all of the callings of the rehabilitative
ideal but will rest squarely on calculated determinations of
future harm. And there is little reason to believe that those
interventions will be any less intrusive or the determinations
any more liberating than the current system. Indeed, there is
every reason to believe they will fail to meet those objectives.
Understanding the consequences of neurolaw’s vision for
the criminal justice system begins with appreciating its
ambition. As a movement which considers the mind as entirely
reducible to explanatory models of neuronal discharge, it
steadfastly maintains that all human mentation will be
revealed through technology. The plain purpose of this
knowledge will be to grant the natural sciences authority in
defining and explaining not just human behavior but the very
essence of humanity. Such authority will be difficult for the law
to resist since it is fundamentally rooted in regulating human
behavior. That authority will play a larger role in formulating
crime policy, and in so doing, will ineluctably lead towards
polices which emphasize behavioral prediction and
incapacitation.
But this is also a movement that views folk psychological
ideas such as the guilty mind with deep suspicion. As a
consequence, the demarcation between what the law considers
criminal and civil is also suspect. Effective crime policy from a
neurolaw perspective is not wedded to folk psychological
notions of wrongfulness or even diseased minds.222 Instead, the
limits are the reach of what the behavioral sciences deems its
expertise and what legislators consider amenable to social
welfare policy. From this position, neurolaw’s cadence of
therapeutic corrections will flow freely as the idea of
punishment is relegated to the province of history. Desert, and
222. See Bruce J Winick, The Jurisprudence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence,
3 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 184, 193 (1997) (“Even people in the criminal
justice system who may not have mental health problems per se may be
thought of as having problems within the purview of therapeutic
jurisprudence.”).
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the human intuitions from which it flows, will finally be excised
from the judgments of wrongfulness.
In place of those judgments will be the measures of science.
Those gauged dimensions of lawful capacity and illicit
propensities will be the underpinnings of this new criminal
justice system. Rather than anchored by entrenched social
norms which consider some behaviors altruistic and others
barbaric, it will project human experience as a random
accident; the fruits of human labor as happenstance
occurrences. The method of neurolaw, quite simply,
understands the mind so elementarily as to see right through it
entirely and instead view it solely as mechanical circuitry
devoid of any of its human meaning.
What can it claim of value to the law then? It asserts that
actions are blameless because of an explanation which is no
explanation at all: only a description which holds motives as
the exclusive domain of propagating genes and their protein
offspring.223 To say that behavior is biological is besides the
pointfew would seriously contend otherwise. But what the
law really cares aboutand has always cared aboutare the
reasons that people attribute to their intentions and behavior.
The language of law is a mirror of humanity which reflects a
rudimentary understanding that people behave because they
have reasons and those reasons manifestly retain value to most
people.224
IV. CONCLUSION
Foundational to our criminal law as commonly understood
is the premise that the state cannot impose punishment where
it cannot impose blame. This quality of the criminal code is the
source for its unique capacity to condemn and sanction severely
by depriving liberty. The act of punishment not only decrees
social condemnation but incapacitates because it assumes that
those who acted wrongly will choose to do so again unless they
bear the full weight of shame society assigns to criminal
conduct. By necessity, behavior judged criminal is thusly
considered by its nature to be willful in a folk psychological

223. See Dawkins, supra note 47.
224. Cf. Rollin M. Perkins, A Rationale for Mens Rea, 52 HARV. L. REV.
905, 905 (1939) (“Deeply ingrained in human nature is the tendency to
distinguish intended results from accidental happenings.”).
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sense.
That moral sense shared across cultures and generations
also understands that people are rooted in their biological
nature but not defined by it. Few routinely say that their
abilities and desires are solely attributable to their constituent
genetic code. Indeed, civilized society has long rejected the idea
that personhood should be narrowly circumscribed by one’s
biology. People reject that idea not only because of its ugly past,
but because most people intuitively know that they are
constituted by their biology but are not identical to it.225 There
is something more to being a person than biology can tell us.
Just as well, people universally desire explanations for
behavior. Most explanations leave us unsatisfied. It is a
uniquely human trait to ponder endlessly why people act and
behave as they do. The allure of cognitive neuroscience is its
promise to make the object of that inquiry transparent.226 But
in so doing, it must remove the attributes which make it
inimitably human. There is no greed or malice or goodwill, only
biophysical flotsam and jetsam and the discharge of neurons.227
And in the process, that explanation destroys the social
intuitions of behavior which give the law its meaning. Blaming
the brain for unlawful behavior is not blame at all. Rather, it
submits justice to the efficient calculation of science itself and
binds it to that pursuit exclusively. A resolute belief in the
value of common intuitions is necessary to the very idea of
justice which is not tyranny or obedience which is not slavery.

225. See, e.g., Walter Glannon, Our Brains Are Not Us, 23 BIOETHICS 321,
321 (2009) (“[T]he brain is necessary but not sufficient to account for all the
physiological and psychological properties that make each of us a unique
person.”).
226. And when matters are transparent, there is nothing left to measure.
See generally LEONARD COHEN, THE FUTURE (Sony/ATV Songs 1992).
227. See generally Stephen J. Morse, Rationality and Responsibility, 74 S.
CAL. L REV. 251, 252, 253 (2000) (discussing the limits of scientific
explanations for behavior under a legal lens).

